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Comment
EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF THE REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

I. INTRODUCTION

With the growth of the multinational corporation 1 and the increased
foreign activity in American securities, 2 a "revolutionary trend toward the
internationalization of the securities markets" has occurred. 3 As a result,
both the securities bar 4 and the courts 5 have been compelled with increasing regularity to determine the extraterritorial effect 6 of various provisions of

1. See Bodolus, The Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, 29 Bus. LAw. 107, 107
(March 1974)(Special Issue).
2. Foreign purchases and sales of American securities increased from $7.8 billion in 1965 to
$30.8 billion for the period of January to November 1976. See Loomis & Grant, The U.S.
Securities And Exchange Commission, Financial Institutions Outside The U.S. And Extraterritorial Application Of The U.S. Securities Laws, 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 3, 24 n.1
(1978) (citations omitted).
3. Bodolus, supra note 1, at 113. See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
528 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (huge foreign investments being made in United States
companies). This trend toward internationalization is evidenced by the increased literature regarding the legal ramifications of the marketing of securities in foreign countries. See, e.g.,
Schaafsma, Netherlands Securities Laws, 33 Bus. LAw. 101 (1977); Thorpe, The Sale of U.S.
Securities in Japan, 29 Bus. LAw. 411 (1974); Project, InternationalSecurities Project, 30 Bus.
LAw. 585 (1975).
4. See, e.g., Hopkins, Problems of Trading in Domestic and Foreign Securities, in FIRST
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECUITIES REGULATION 308 (1970); Williams, Trading In the United
States In Foreign Securities Distributed Outside The United States Without Registration Under
The Securities Act of 1933, in SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 327
(1975); Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects Of Securities Regulation: Towards A
Reevaluation Of Section 30(b) Of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REv. 1015
(1969); Karmel, The ExtraterritorialApplication Of The Federal Securities Code, 7 CONN. L.
REV. 669 (1975); Loomis & Grant, supra note 2. Student work on the subject of the extraterritorial application of the securities laws has also been published with increasing frequency. See,
e.g., Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 94 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ExtraterritorialApplication]; Note, American Adjudication
Of TransnationalSecurities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Transnational Securities Fraud]; Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 1363 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Reach of Rule 10b-5].
5. See United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 119 (1978).
For a complete discussion of the major cases in the area of the extraterritorial application of the
securities laws, see notes 83-177 and accompanying text infra.
6. This comment will focus on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. It is therefore assumed that a plaintiff seeking to adjudicate a claim in a United States court has been able to
obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant. For an examination of the often complex issue
of personal jurisdiction in transnational securities transactions, see Garner v. Enright, 71 F. R. D.
656, 659-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Wagman v. Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497, 499-502 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24-27 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Loomis & Grant,
supra note 2, at 13-15. See also Karmel, supra note 4, at 697-701. Most courts have determined
that the inquiry with respect to personal jurisdiction under the securities laws is one of due
process. See Sun First Nat'l Bank of Orlando v. Miller, 77 F.R.D. 430, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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the United States securities laws. 7 While most of the recent discussion has
focused upon the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 8 the scope of
the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) 9 presents important extraterritorial issues. Although the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has officially maintained that it will not apply the registration requirements of the 1933 Act to domestic securities offered in foreign
countries exclusively to foreign investors, 10 this position is subject to
change" since it is not premised upon a conclusion that the SEC lacks
.7. There are eight major statutes involving federal regulation of the securities industry. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) (Securities Act of 1933); id. §§ 77bb-77mm (Corporation of
Foreign Bondholders Act of 1933); id. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (Trust Indenture Act of 1939); id. §§
78a-78kk (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); id. §§ 78aaa-78111 (Securities Investor Protection Act
of 1970); id. §§ 79 to 79z,6 (Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); id. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52
(Investment Company Act of 1940); id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
This comment will focus primarily on the Securities Act of 1933 and, where appropriate, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Nevertheless, the basic principles discussed herein may be
applied in an analysis of any of the other federal statutes.
8. Id. §§ 78a-78kk. See, e.g., Goldman & Magrino, supra note 4; Karmel, supra note 4;
Loomis & Grant, supra note 2; Reach of Rule 10b-5, supra note 4. See also Extraterritorial
Application, supra note 4; TransnationalSecurities Fraud, supra note 4; 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL

L. 150 (1971).

9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e (1976). The registration requirements are detailed in § 5 of the 1933
Act, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments or transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium
of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by
any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale
or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to
any security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this
subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 77j of this
title; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any
such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied or
preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section 77j
of this title.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to
offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any
security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security, or while the
registration statement is the subject of a refusal order ....
id.
10. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9,828, reprinted in 1 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
1361-1363 (July .9, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Release 4708]. For a detailed
discussion of the position taken by the SEC regarding the registration requirements for foreign
offerings, see notes 52-82 and accompanying text infra.
11. The SEC has changed its position in this area at least once. Initially, the SEC took the
position that distributions from the United States into foreign countries did not have to be
registered because the issues constituted private offerings within the meaning of the statute's
private offering exemption. See ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1604, Comment c(4), at 167 (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1974). Although the statute was not amended, the SEC altered its position and now
maintains that while such distributions still need not be registered, it is only because the SEC
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jurisdiction over such offerings. 12 In addition, in the absence of rules or
regulations adopting the SEC's position, it is questionable whether private
litigants are bound by that agency's interpretation of the registration requirements. 13 Moveover, the recent adoption of the Federal Securities
has decided as a matter of "agency grace" or prosecutorial discretion that registration is not
required. Id. The significance of this change in position is exemplified by the SEC's action in
SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973). In United Financial Group,
the SEC argued that the registration provisions of the 1933 Act apply whenever aiparty uses
any facility of interstate commerce. Id. at 357. See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1244 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as JENNINGS & MARSH].
12. Release 4708, supra note 10,
1361, at 2123-24. The SEC noted in its release:
Since "interstate commerce" is defined in Section 2(7) of the Act to include "trade or
commerce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto . .. between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia," this
might be construed to encompass virtually any offering of securities made by a United
States corporation to foreign investors.
Id. at 2124 (emphasis added).
An additional problem with the current position of the SEC in this area is that it is unclear
whether its policy of not requiring registration extends to secondary offerings of securities. See
id.
1361-1363, at 2123-25. Moreover, it is unclear whether an American issuer may rely on
Release 4708 when it conducts a "private placement" and the private placement purchasers
purchase with a view toward distribution in a foreign country. Id.
13. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 11, at 1244 n.14. Section 19(a) of the 1933 Act
provides in pertinent part:
The Commission shall have the authority from time to time to make, amend, and
rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
subchapter. . . .No provision of this subchapter imposing any liability shall apply to any
act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation ....
15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976). At least one court has held that releases in stop-order proceedings
under § 8(d) of the 1933 Act, id. § 77h(d), "do not have the effect of rules and regulations of the
SEC" adopted pursuant to the SEC's § 19 power. DiJulio v. Digicon, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1284,
1290 (D. Md. 1972). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however,
appears to take the position that a formal adoption of a rule is not necessary in order for the
defendant to invoke the protection of the "good faith" reliance test of § 19. See Byrnes v.
Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1977). In Byrnes, the Second Circuit
held that reliance on a securities act release which consisted of an opinion of the SEC general
counsel did not satisfy the "good faith" reliance test of § 19, noting that the appellants' reliance
.,was an elaborately reasoned interpretation directly contrary to literal language." Id.at 1313.
The Second Circuit concluded that "section 19 is not applicable unless there has been conformity with an SEC rule, regulation, or at least a 'general understanding . .. regularly given
effect by the Commission's staff in dealing with lawyers who specialize in SEC matters' or 'an
article of faith among lawyers specializing in the securities field.'" Id., quoting Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1293, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
Such an interpretation of § 19 would appear to contravene a literal reading of the
statute-the SEC is authorized to promulgate "rules and regulations." See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a)
(1976). For the pertinent text of § 19, See note 13 supra. Since the power of an administrative
agency is derived from its governing statute, arguably a private litigant could contend that the
SEC lacks the authority to alter substantive rights by merely adopting a general policy or issuing an informal interpretive release. Cf. Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367
U.S. 316, 322 (1961) (question of power of CAB is determined not by what the Board thinks it
should do, but rather by what Congress has said it can do). Moreover, if Congress intended that
the registration requirements are not to be applied extraterritorially, the SEC has no power to
alter that determination. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 (1976) (rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency is not the power to make law). See also JENNINGS
& MARSH, supra note 11, at 1244 n.14. It is probable, however, that reliance on SEC releases
will insulate the party from injunctive action by that agency. See SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp.,
326 F. Supp. 943, 955-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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Code (Code) by the American Law Institute makes an examination of the
4
extraterritoriality issues particularly appropriate.'
This comment will discuss the pertinent sections of the 1933 Act and
provide a brief review of the interpretive tools employed by courts to determine the extraterritorial effect of securities legislation. Part III will present a detailed examination of the SEC's position regarding foreign offerings.
Following a discussion of the major judicial decisions in this area of the law
in Part IV, Part V will provide a brief review of the position taken by the
American Law Institute in the Federal Securities Code. The article will conclude with a synthesization of the information in an attempt to identify the
scope of the registration requirements under the 1933 Act.
II. STATUTORY EXAMINATION

A. The 1933 Act
In enacting the 1933 Act, Congress intended to facilitate investor
decisionmaking through the development of a full-scale disclosure system. 15
The statutory scheme incorporates two principal substantive prohibitions.
First, the statute prohibits the sale or offering for sale of securities without
adherence to a mandated presale registration and disclosure process. 16 Second, the statute proscribes fraudulent conduct in connection with the offer
or sale of any security. 17 Although exemptions exist with respect to the

14. See ALl FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft March 1978). For a discussion of the
Federal Securities Code, see notes 178-207 and accompanying text infra. The American Law
Institute approved the Federal Securities Code Project in December 1968. See Loss, The
American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAw. 27 (1969). This project
was primarily an attempt to reform and modify the existing securities statutes and accompanying
administrative policies. See Titus, Unification, Modernization And A Modicum Of Predictability:
An Introduction To The ProposedFederal Securities Code, 7 CONN. L. REV. 658, 658-59 (1975).
According to Professor Loss, who authored the introduction to the proposed official draft, the
three principal aims of the Code are
1) simplification of an inevitably complex body of law in light of some four decades of
administration and litigation; 2) elimination (so far as possible) of duplicate regulation; and
3) reexamination of the entire scheme of investor protection with a view toward increasing
its efficiency and doing so, in President Roosevelt's words, "with the least possible interference to honest business."
ALl FED. SEC. CODE at XV (Proposed Official Draft March 1978).
15. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
16. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77h, 77j (1976). Many commentators argue that the costs to issuers
of compliance with the registration and disclosure procedures inhibits the raising of capital. See
Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic And Intrastate Offering
Exemptions From Registration For The Sale Of Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 622, 622 (1974).
This may especially be true in light of the express provision in the 1933 Act that "[n]othing in
this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or office
performing like functions) of any State or Territory of the United States, or the District of
Columbia, over any security or any person." 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976). Issuers must therefore
comply with state as well as federal requirements.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q (1976). The antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act are very similar to
those in the 1934 Act. Compare id. (1933 Act) with id. § 78j (1934 Act). See also 17 C.F.R. §
240. 10b-5 (1978).
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registration requirements,"' the antifraud provisions apply regardless of
whether the offering has been registered. 19
The primary requirements of the presale registration and disclosure
process are codified in section 5,20 which specifically provides that a registration statement be in effect and a prospectus be delivered prior to the public
sale of any security. 21 Furthermore, the statute delegates broad regulatory
powers to the SEC that authorize the agency to define the specific information required in registration statements 2 2 and to formulate other necessary

18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1976). Exemptions to the registration and prospectus delivery requirements are provided for "certain types of... securities transactions where there is no
practical need for . . . [the 1933 Act's] application or where the public benefits are too remote."
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1933). Unless a transaction falls within a stated
exemption, registration and the delivery of a prospectus are required. See SEC v. MonoKearsarge Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248, 252 (D. Utah 1958). Moreover, the statutory
exemptions are narrowly construed. See United States v. Wolfson, 269 F. Supp. 621, 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). In addition, it is clear that the person claiming the exemption has the burden
of proving that the transaction falls within the statutory language. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,
346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
While § 3 exempts specified securities from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act,
see 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1976), § 4 provides that certain transactions are exempt from the provisions of § 5. See id. § 77d. The effect of § 4 is to provide that only transactions conducted by
issuers, underwriters, and dealers are subject to the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of the 1933 Act. See id. § 77d(1)-(4). Furthermore, issuers are exempt from the
requirements of § 5 if they engage in a transaction "not involving any public offering." Id. §
77d(2). Moreover, if a dealer meets the time requirements of § 4, he may also be exempt from
the requirements of § 5. Id. § 77d(3) (A)-(C). Unlike the dealer or issuer, the underwriter
generally cannot take advantage of an exemption. See R. HERWITZ, CORPORATIONS COURSE
GAME PLAN 2.8 (1975). In addition, the statutory definition of an underwriter is quite broad.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11). Courts have consistently referred to the broad statutory language in
holding that an underwriter includes anyone who participates, directly or indirectly, in a distribution of securities to the public. See SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1959)
(broker purchasing from other brokers was an underwriter because of close association with
people in control group). See also SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp.
106, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970) (mere fact
that defendants were not in privity of contract with issuer does not alter their status as underwriters).
19. SEC v. Cal-Am Corp., 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,347 (C.D. Cal. 1978). See also
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226, 37 Fed. Reg. 600, reprinted in 1 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 2785 (Jan. 10, 1972).
20. 15 U.S.C. 9 77e (1976). See Loomis & Grant, supra note 2, at 6.
21. 15 U.S.C. 9 77e (1976). For the text of § 5, see note 9 supra. The prospectus may
accompany the security, 15 U. S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1976). In addition to regulating the sale of the
security, the statute also regulates the extent to which the securities may be offered for sale
prior to the effective date of a registration statement. Id. §§ 77e(b)(1), (c). No offers or sales may
be made prior to the filing of the registration statement. Id. § 77e(c). After the registration
statement has been filed, the statute permits oral offers but limits written offers to certain
specified forms. id. §§ 77e(b)(1), 77j(b). Notwithstanding the allowance of certain offers following the filing of the registration statement, no sales may be consummated until after the registration statement has become effective. Id. § 77e(a).
22. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j(c), 77s (1976). Typical of this broad delegation is the statutory
mandate that "[a]ny prospectus shall contain such other information as the Commission may by
rules or regulations require as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." Id. § 77j(c).
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directives in order to implement the disclosure process of the 1933 Act. 23
In addition, in order to assure compliance with the disclosure procedure and
other statutory requirements, the 1933 Act provides extensive criminal 24
and civil liabilities 25 for a breach of its provisions. 26 For example, failure to
register an otherwise registerable offering subjects the seller of the unregistered security to an action for rescission by his purchaser even if the

23. See id. § 77s(a). For the pertinent text of this provision, see note 13 supra. The SEC has
used its rulemaking authority to modify or expand the statutory mandate in several areas. One
example is with respect to the effective date of a registration statement. The statute provides
that the registration statement becomes effective 20 days after its filing, or after the filing of an
amendment thereunder, unless the SEC prescribes an earlier date. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1976).
The SEC has adopted a rule in which it describes the circumstances under which it will "accelerate" the effective date of the registration statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1978). Both the
statute and the SEC rules and regulations must therefore be examined in order to determine
the complete requirements regarding the registration and disclosure process.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976). Specifically, a person convicted of a willful violation of the Act
may be "fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both." Id.
25. Even if the offering is registered, extensive civil liability provisions exist for violations of
other substantive provisions of the 1933 Act. For example, if the prospectus or oral communication employed in the sale of a security is false or misleading as to a material fact, the purchaser
may maintain a damage or rescission action. Id. § 771(2). If the defendant can prove that "he did
not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known" that the communication
was false or misleading, he may escape liability. Id. Moreover, the purchaser cannot know that
the statement was false or misleading. Id.
Regardless of whether a purchaser is in privity of contract with a defendant, the statute
confers on the purchaser a cause of action for damages against numerous participants in the
distribution scheme in the event that the filed registration statement was false or misleading.
Id. § 77k. The purchaser may sue every person who signed the registration statement, every
director of the issuer, every person about to become a director of the issuer and who was
named, with that person's consent, in the registration statement, every "expert" who "certified"
the registration statement, and every "underwriter." Id. § 77k(a).
The statute, however, provides a number of defenses. If the defendants can prove that the
purchaser knew of the false or misleading statement, they may escape liability. Id. In addition,
if the purchaser bought the security after the issuer had made available to its security holders
an earnings statement covering a period of at least 12 months after the registration statement
became effective, the purchaser must prove that he relied upon the registration statement in
making his securities purchase. Id. Nevertheless, the purchaser need not prove that he read the
registration statement. Id. Finally, the statute also recognizes a number of "due diligence"
defenses. Id. § 77k(b)-(d). See also Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Liability under § 11 is joint and several. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976). Moreover, the measure
of damages depends upon the time at which the plaintiff disposes of the security, with the
maximum recovery being limited to the amount paid for the security. Id. § 77k(e).
In addition to the aforementioned liabilities, a purchaser of securities has other remedies
under the 1933 Act. If the seller engages in fraudulent conduct with respect to the offer or sale
of a security, the buyer may recover under the general antifraud provisions regardless of
77
whether the statute required registration of the offering. Id. §
q. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, the buyer may recover from anyone who "controls" a person who is
liable to the buyer under § 11 or § 12 of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976). Finally, the
statute provides that the "rights and remedies provided by this subchapter shall be in addition
to any and all other rights and remedies that exist at law or in equity." Id. § 77p.
26. The SEC may also pursue injunctive relief or seek a writ of mandamus directing a
person to comply with the statute or an SEC order promulgated pursuant to the agency's
statutory authority. 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1976).
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seller's actions were not intended as a deliberate attempt to circumvent the
27
statutory requirements.
With respect to the extraterritorial scope of the disclosure and registration requirements, the 1933 Act is not clear. Section 22 provides in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction
of offenses and violations under this subchapter and under the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission . . . concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
subchapter. 28
Although it is clear from section 22 that a system of concurrent jurisdiction is
established, this provision provides little insight into the extraterritorial
reach of the 1933 Act. Similarly, an examination of the substantive provisions
of section 5 furnishes no further guidance on the extraterritoriality issue.
According to the statutory language, section 5 applies where the sale of securities takes place in "interstate commerce." ' 29 The statute defines interstate commerce as "trade or commerce in securities or any transportation
or communication relating thereto among . . . or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia. "30 This definition of interstate commerce appears to confer subject matter jurisdiction
over most, if not all, transnational securities transactions. In examining the
extraterritorial reach of other statutes which define interstate commerce in a
similar fashion, however, most courts and commentators appear to have con31
cluded that the statutory definition is not dispositive.
B. Interpretive Tools
Whether a statute unclear on its face is to be applied extraterritorially
32
depends upon principles of statutory construction and international law.
27. Id. § 771(1). The purchaser may recover damages if he no longer owns the security. id.
Of course, if the offering is exempt from the registration requirements of § 5, the defendant
may escape liability. For a discussion of the applicable exemptions, see note 18 and accompanying text supra.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976).
29. For the text of § 5, see note 9 supra.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1976) (emphasis added). Similar definitions of interstate commerce
are provided in the 1934 Act, id. § 78c(a)(17); the Investment Company Act of 1940, id. §
80a-2(a)(18); and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, id. § 80b-2(a)(10).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 119
(1978) (no discussion of statutory definition); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th
Cir. 1977) (no discussion of statutory definition); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (court conducted detailed inquiry into congressional intent and decided case without reliance on interstate commerce definition); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (congressional intent dispositive, not any one statutory
provision). See also Karmel, supra note 4, at 671-73; Loomis & Grant, supra note 2, at 6. But
cf. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977) (court relied
in part on interstate commerce definition as evidence of congressional intent).
32. See Tomlinson, Federal Regulation of Secondary Trading in Foreign Securities, 32 Bus.
LAw. 463, 495 n.150 (1977).
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While the general rule of statutory construction is that all legislation is prima
facie territorial, 33 Congress has the power to provide for extraterritorial application. 34 Although Congress need not follow principles of international
law when it provides that a statute should be given extraterritorial effect, 35
most courts presume that it does follow such principles absent a clear indication to the contrary. 36 While it is generally recognized that the securities
laws do not evidence such a contrary intent, 37 the extent to which Congress
intended to incorporate international law principles into the application of
the securities laws is not clear.38 An examination of the major principles of
international law is therefore appropriate.
American courts generally accept the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (Restatement) 39 as the appropriate summary of international law principles. 40 Although the Restatement provides
that a state may have jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law in numerous
circumstances, 41 three such situations appear most appropriate to an analysis
of transnational securities transactions. The first, and perhaps broadest basis
for jurisdiction, is grounded solely upon the nationality of the defendant.
According to the Restatement, "[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule
of law . . . attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state

33. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
34. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), modified, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). In Schoenbaumn, the Second Circuit stated
"that Congress intended the ... [1934] Act to have extraterritorial application in order
to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to
protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in
American securities." 405 F.2d at 206.
35. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
36. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,
21-22 (1963) (clear expression of congressional intent required in order to apply United States
labor laws to foreign-flag vessels); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
118 (1804) (act of Congress should not be construed so as to violate "law of nations" if other
construction is possible).
37. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). In
Leasco, the Second Circuit recognized that Congress has the power to legislate beyond the
scope recognized by principles of international law, but concluded that "the language of § 10(b)
of the . . . [1934] Act is much too inconclusive to lead us to believe that Congress meant to
impose rules governing conduct throughout the world in every instance where an American
company bought or sold a security." Id. at 1334, citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
38. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (court acknowledged inability to indicate the part of the legislative history
of the 1934 Act that compelled its conclusion that Americans should be permitted to maintain
their suit in a transnational securities case); Loomis & Grant, supra note 2, at 6; Transnational
Securities Fraud, supra note 4, at 553.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965).
40. See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 113 n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); Venture Fund Int'l v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 554 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1194-95 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also Transnational
Securities Fraud, supra note 4, at 554.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
10-36 (1965).
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wherever the conduct occurs." 4 2 Relying on this principle, it may be argued that a domestic corporation is required to register every nonexempt
offering of securities, even those which take place exclusively in a foreign
43
country. This argument, however, has met with little success.
The other two principal bases upon which a state may exercise jurisdiction consistent with international law principles are more limited since they
arise primarily from the territorial powers of the state. The Restatement
provides that "[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law ... attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether
or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory, and relating to . . . [an] interest localized in its territory." 44 In addition, even if the conduct occurs wholly outside of the state,
the Restatement provides that
[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and
causes an effect within its territory, if ... the conduct and its

effects are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime
or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
45
systems.

42. Id. § 30(1)(a). Section 30(1)(b) provides an alternative basis for jurisdiction: "A state has
jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law as to the status of a national or as to an interest of a
national, wherever the thing or other subject-matter to which the interest relates is located."
Id. § 30(1)(b). On the other hand, a state has no jurisdiction "to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside .. . [the state's] territory merely on the
ground that the conduct affects one of . . . [the state's] nationals." id. § 30(2).
43. See lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975). In 1IT, the Second Circuit
refused to apply § 30(1)(a) to a case involving transnational securities transactions. Id. The court
noted that "[a]lthough the United States has power to prescribe the conduct of its nationals
everywhere in the world, . . . Congress does not often do so and courts are forced to interpret
the statute at issue in the particular case." Id. Referring to the securities laws, the court
reasoned that "[i]t is 'simply unimaginable that Congress would have wished the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws to apply if, for example, . . .[the American defendant] while in
London had . . . defrauded only European investors." Id. The Second Circuit concluded that
the fact that one of the defendants was a United States citizen did not "alone ... give subject
matter jurisdiction." Id.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965) (emphasis added). The Restatement provides the following illustrations of how § 17 operates:
Illustrations:
1. X hides a bomb aboard a plane in state A. The bomb explodes while the plane is
flying over state B, causing the plane to crash, killing all the passengers. A has
jurisdiction to prescribe a criminal penalty for homicide.
2. X and Y are in state A. X makes a misrepresentation to Y. X and Y go to state B.
Solely because of the prior misrepresentation, Y delivers money to X. A has jurisdiction to prescribe a criminal penalty for obtaining money by false pretenses.
Id., Comment a, Illustrations 1, 2.
45. Id. § 18(a) (emphasis added). Section 18 also provides that
[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory if
(b)(1)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and
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Courts have focused on the latter two bases for jurisdiction 46 in cases
involving transnational securities transactions. 47 Although the facts of each
case vary greatly, the ultimate issue has been the amount of conduct or the
magnitude of effect required before subject matter jurisdiction attaches
under the securities laws. 48 While it is apparent that a foreign issuer offering securities in the United States is engaged in conduct sufficient to require
compliance with the federal registration requirements, 4 9 other cases involving transnational securities transactions and conduct occurring in the United
States are not so clear. 50 Similarly, it has been difficult for courts to determine the point at which jurisdiction attaches when it is predicated upon the
51
asserted effects of conduct that occurs outside the United States.
III. THE SEC POSITION
A. Release 4708
Responding to the recommendations of a Presidential Task Force convened to develop programs to increase foreign marketing of American securities, 52 the SEC promulgated Securities Act Release No. 4708 (Release

foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent
with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
id. § 18(b).
46. In this comment, reference to the "conduct doctrine or theory" will indicate jurisdiction
based on § 17 of the Restatement, while § 18 jurisdiction will be referred to as the "effects
doctrine or theory."
47. See, e.g., IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (2d Cir. 1972). Not all circuits have held
that jurisdiction may be based upon either "conduct" in the United States or "effects" in the
United States. See United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 283 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 119, (1978) (court leaves for another day the determination of whether jurisdiction could be
grounded solely on the "effects" in the United States). Moreover, at least one circuit has rejected the argument that since principles of international law may permit a country to prescribe
the conduct of its nationals everywhere in the world, the securities laws apply if the defendant
is a United States citizen. See lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975).
48. See, e.g., liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
49. See, e.g., Haber v. Bordas, [1975] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,330 (S.D.N'Y. 1975)
(registration required for sale of foreign securities in New York); SEC v. Antoine Silver Mines,
Ltd., 299 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. I11. 1968) (Canadian issuer enjoined from distributing shares in
United States without registration). See also Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421, 422
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969) (Canadian corporation acts within jurisdiction
of United States when it buys and sells securities on New York Stock Exchange).
50. Compare liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) with Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
51. See cases cited in note 48 supra. Some commentators suggest that United States courts
are incorrect when they apply the principles of international law to the extraterritorial issue
since international law principles do not account for such important considerations as international diplomacy and economic policy. See Sanberg, The ExtraterritorialReach of American
Economic Regulation: The Case of Securities Law, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 315 (1976) (commentator would substitute conflicts of law approach).
52. Release 4708, supra note 10,
1361, at 2123-24. In October 1963, a "Presidential Task
Force on Promoting Increased Foreign Investment in United States Corporate Securities and
Increased Foreign Financing for United States Corporations Operating Abroad" was appointed.
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4708). 53 According to this release, the SEC will not, as a general proposition, exercise jurisdiction over foreign offerings of American securities directed exclusively to foreign investors in foreign countries. 54 The SEC has
maintained, however, that interstate commerce, as defined in the 1933
Act, 5 5 "might be construed to encompass virtually any offering of securities
made by a United States corporation to foreign investors." ' 56 It therefore
appears that the SEC's position is not that the statute does not confer jurisdiction over such offerings, but rather that the agency will decline to exer57
cise jurisdiction as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
Although Release 4708 does not provide a detailed explanation of the
SEC's position regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction, it does state that the
"Commission has traditionally taken the position that the registration
requirements of Section 5 of the Act are primarily intended to protect
American investors. ' 58 Consequently, the SEC will decline to exercise
jurisdiction over an offering as long as the securities distributed come to rest
abroad. 59 Accordingly, "it is immaterial whether the offering originates
from within or outside of the United States, whether domestic or foreign
broker-dealers are involved and whether the actual mechanics of the dis0
tribution are effected within the United States." 6
Nevertheless, the SEC has acknowledged that there may be situations
where registration of a foreign offering would be required if the offering is
directed toward American nationals living abroad. 61 In addition, due to the
geographic proximity of Canada to the United States, the SEC has maintained that "a distribution ... through the facilities of Canadian Stock Exchanges may be expected to flow into the hands of American investors and
may therefore be subject to registration." 62 The crucial ingredient for the

Id. at 2123. Among the programs the task force was charged with developing were those "for a
review of governmental and private activities adversely affecting such financing, and for an
appraisal of the various barriers to such financing remaining in major foreign capital markets."
Id.

53. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9,828, reprinted in I FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 4 1361-1363 (July 9, 1964).
54. Release 4708, supra note 10, $$ 1361-1362, at 2123-25. It is important to distinguish
between the sale of investment company securities and noninvestment company securities. The
former are not covered by Release 4708 since investment companies are always "in registration," thus imposing no additional burden on them to register securities sold abroad. See SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5068 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 77,
828, at 83,914-15 (June 23, 1970).
55. For the definition of "interstate commerce" in the 1933 Act, see text accompanying note
30 supra.
56. Release 4708, supra note 10,
1362, at 2124.
57. Id. See also note 11 supra.
58. Release 4708, supra note 10, $ 1362, at 2124.
59. Id. But see note 11 supra.
60. Release 4708, supra note 10, 4 1362, at 2124.
61. Id. For example, the SEC specifically noted that an offering directed to American servicemen living abroad would have to be registered. Id.
62. Id. In other regulatory areas, such as in the periodic and supplementary reporting
requirements of § 15(d), the SEC has also differentiated between North American and other
foreign issuers. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-16 (1978).
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assumption of jurisdiction would thus appear to63 be the involvement of
American investors in the scheme of distribution.
Beyond the question of the application of section 5 to foreign offerings,
Release 4708 also deals with the impact of foreign distributions on the availability of the private placement exemption under the 1933 Act. Generally,
the SEC has stated that "transactions otherwise meeting the requirements of
this exemption need not be integrated with simultaneous offerings being
made abroad." 6 4 Presumably, this "simultaneous offering abroad" would
still be subject to the requirement that those securities come to rest
65
abroad.
B. SEC No-Action Letters
In addition to administrative releases, the SEC also publishes requests
for no-action letters, together with the responses to such requests by the
SEC staff. These no-action requests are letters to the SEC seeking interpretive advice or a statement that, on the basis of the facts stated therein, the
SEC would not take any enforcement action. 66 Although no-action letters
effectively bind only the SEC and the party requesting the information, 67
they are nonetheless helpful 68 in further defining the SEC's position with
regard to various securities problems. In particular, numerous no-action letter requests concerning Release 4708 illustrate the practical application by
the SEC of the principles announced in that release.
While the majority of the SEC's responses to no-action letter requests
concerning registration of extraterritorial offerings endorses a literal inter-

63. According to the SEC, if the requirements of Release 4708 are met, "dealers may trade
in other securities of the same class in the United States without regard to the time limitations
of the dealer's exemption in Section 4(1) [now 4(3)]." Release 4708, supra note 10,
1362, at
2124.
64. Id.
65. Id. See Salt Cay Beaches, Ltd., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,985 (Oct. 14, 1974); text accompanying note 59 supra. Release 4708 also addresses the issue
of the applicability of § 15(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780(a) (1976), to foreign underwriters.
Release 4708, supra note 10,
1363, at 2125. Basically, the SEC has concluded that if the
foreign underwriter participates in a foreign offering of American securities, and limits his activities to sales to foreigners outside the jurisdiction of the United States, then it is not necessary that he register as a broker-dealer pursuant to § 15(a). Id.
66. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 11, at 33 n.(a).
67. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4924, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 77,606 (Sept. 20, 1968).
'68. Although generally helpful, the SEC's practice of issuing no-action letters has been
criticized for allegedly resulting in interpretations that are inconsistent with applicable statutes,
SEC releases, and judicial decisions. See Loss, Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and
Accountants-Summary Remarks, 30 Bus. LAW. 163, 164-65 (March 1975) (Special Issue);
Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts With Existing Statutes, Cases and Commission
Releases, 59 VA. L. REV. 303 (1973). The SEC may limit the usefulness of its no-action letters
by the statement at the end of its opinion to the effect that "this letter only expresses the
Division's position on enforcement action and does not purport to express any legal conclusion
on the question presented." See The Singer Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 79,979 (Sept. 3, 1974).
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pretation of Release 4708,69 at least one letter appears inconsistent with the
rest.7 0 The matter involved a United States corporation which proposed to
issue stock solely to European nationals living in Europe. 7' The stock certificates were to contain legends restricting their sale in the United
States.72 Without substantial explanation, the SEC concluded that "it would
appear appropriate for the Company to consider the advisabiliy of registering
...under the Securities Act of 1933." 73 In so concluding, the SEC implicitly indicated a concern that although the corporation's shares were not
to be offered in the United States, great domestic interest in the corporation
might lead to the development of a market in this country and result in a
public distribution of the stock.74 Since the corporation, however, had expressly agreed to instruct the transfer agent not to transfer shares to American nationals and to employ a restrictive legend on the stock certificate,7 5
the distribution apparently would have been "effected in a manner which
will result in the securities coming to rest abroad" as required by Release
4708.76 By failing to adequately explain its reasoning with respect to its
suggestion that the corporation consider the advisability of registering the
foreign offering, the SEC has apparently offered advice that is incompatible
with Release 4708.
Despite the apparent inconsistency of this particular response with Release 4708, numerous no-action letters have been issued which are in accord
with that release. 77 In responses in which registration of the foreign offering was not advised, the SEC noted the existence of adequate safeguards
designed to protect against the distribution of unregistered securities in the
United States. 7 8 It appears as though there are at least two prerequisites to

69. See, e.g., H.P. Bulmer, Ltd. (Feb. 24, 1978); Spirit Mountain Farm West (Feb. 6,
1978).

70.
78,569
71.
72.

See Frederick's of Hollywood, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
(Dec. 9, 1971).
Id. at 81,229.
id.

73. Id.
74. Id.

at 81,228.
at 81,228-30.

75. Id. The corporation also agreed to require letters of nondistributive intent from all purchasers. Id. at 81,228. Each purchaser would be required to represent that "he is not a United
States national or resident, [and] that he is not buying the shares as agent for any U.S. national
or resident." Id. Moreover, the share certificates to be "delivered in settlement . . [would] be
registered in a 'recognized marking name.' " Id.
76. Release 4708, supra note 10,
1362, at 2124. In many other no-action letter requests,
the SEC has indicated that the precautions suggested in Frederick's of Hollywood were sufficient to assure that the securities would not be distributed in the United States. See notes 78-81
and accompanying text infra.
77. See note 69 and accompanying text supra; note 78 infra.
78. See, e.g., H.P. Bulmer, Ltd. (Feb. 24, 1978) (registration not required where no American market existed, purchasers signed letter evidencing nondistributive intent, and restrictive
legends employed); Spirit Mountain Farm West (Feb. 6, 1978) (registration not required because offering circular, suitability letter, subscription letter, and certificates contained absolute
prohibition with respect to resale to United States or Canadian citizens or their agents); Foote,
Cone & Belding Communications, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,523 (June 21, 1976) (registration not required where purchasers were limited in amount of
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receiving SEC approval to conduct an unregistered foreign distribution.
First, the issuer should utilize restrictive legends on the share certificates. 79 The SEC has recognized that the primary benefit of restrictive
legends is to insure "that ... [the shares] are not sold, transferred or
otherwise disposed of to citizens or residents of the U.S. unless they are
registered ...or in the opinion of. . .counsel an exemption from registration is available." 80 Second, the issuer should require that all purchasers
sign a letter of nondistributive intent. 8 ' In requiring such procedures, the
SEC's administrative practice appears consistent with its determination that
"the registration requirements of section 5 ... are primarily intended
to
82
protect American investors."
IV. MAJOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS

To date, there has not been a judicial decision in which the jurisdictional scope of the registration requirements of the 1933 Act was the sole

purchases and restrictive legends employed). See also Popular Espagnol Int'l N.V., [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 79,184 (Dec. 21,'1972) (Netherlands corporation
may sell notes to foreign banks and foreign branches of American banks without registration);
Test Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 78,131 (April 19, 1971)
(SEC refused no-action position when corporation only planned to prohibit redistribution into
the United States for one year).
At least one court has recognized that restrictive legends are the most effective device for
preventing the sale of restricted securities. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d
801, 810 (2d Cir. 1975). The SEC apparently agrees. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226,
37 Fed. Reg. 600, reprinted in 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2785, at 2923-3 (Jan. 10, 1972)
(SEC strongly recommends use of restrictive legends in privately placed securities).
79. See, e.g., H.P. Bulmer, Ltd. (Feb. 24, 1978); Spirit Mountain Farm West (Feb. 6,
1978); Foote, Cone & Belding Communications, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,523 (June 21, 1976).
80. See Sulpetro Int'l, Ltd. (Aug. 25, 1977). In this letter, the SEC permitted a Louisiana
corporation to sell shares to alien partners of a West German limited partnership without registration: The shares had been acquired in a private placement pursuant to rule 146, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.146 (1978), one year earlier. Resale of the shares was therefore restricted. In addition to
permitting the shares to be sold in an unregistered transaction, the SEC stated that the sale to
the West German limited partnership would not affect the status of the previous rule 146 transaction. The SEC agreed with the corporation's argument that since nonresidents who may receive securities in a simultaneous foreign offering are not included in the determination of the
availability of the private placement exemption to registration, it would be inconsistent to have
a subsequent foreign offering affect the status of the prior transaction. See also note 78 supra.
81. See, e.g., H.P. Bulmer. Ltd. (Feb. 24, 1978); Spirit Mountain Farm West (Feb. 6,
1978). For an example of the language used in a letter of nondistributive intent, see note 75
supra.
82. Release 4708, supra note 10, $ 1362, at 2124. See text accompanying note 58 supra. In a
related area, the SEC has indicated that its primary concern with respect to the registration
requirements under rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978), is with activities in the domestic
markets. See Genstar, Ltd., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 80,358
(Oct. 6, 1975). Specifically, the SEC has noted that "one of the chief purposes underlying the
adoption of rule 144 was to facilitate sales of relatively small amounts of restricted securities in
the domestic markets of the United States." Id. In Genstar, Ltd., the corporation generally
conducted its share transactions over foreign exchanges. Id. It unsuccessfully contended that the
volume limitations of rule 144 should be determined by reference to transactions conducted on
all exchanges and not solely by the volume traded on American exchanges. Id.
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issue confronting the court. 83 Although a number of cases involved allegations that the defendants had violated section 5, violations of the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 Act 84 and the 1934 Act 8 5 were also alleged.
83. In 1975, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York decided
a case in which the sole question was whether a foreign defendant had violated the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act. See Haber v. Bordas, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) $ 95,330 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court, however, focused on the isue of whether the
seller had satisfied the requirements of the "private offering" exemption. Id. at 98,658. The
jurisdictional issue was resolved by a mere citation to Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1973). [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,330, at 98,658. In addition, Haber provides little insight into the question of the extraterritorial reach of § 5 since the sale was to an American investor and the transaction took place
in the United States. Id. at 98,656-57. There was therefore little support for the argument that
the court lacked jurisdiction. See also note 49 and accompanying text supra.
84. The 1933 Act contains two antifraud provisions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q (1976).
Section 12(2) provides that a purchaser may recover damages from his seller if the prospectus
delivered to him is false or misleading. Id. § 771(2). See also notes 19 & 25 and accompanying
text supra. Section 17, on the other hand, is similar to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1976), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q (1976). For the text of
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act, see note 85 infra. Specifically, § 17 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities ...
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q (1976). The major difference between § 17 and § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is that
the former has been construed to provide relief only to purchasers of securities, 3 L. Loss, SECURIT1ES REGULATION

1785 (2d ed. 1961), while the latter is available to both purchasers and

sellers of securities. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 272-74 (9th Cir. 1961); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Moreover, it is clear that § 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 provide the basis for an implied private damages remedy. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). Whether § 17 provides a
basis for such an implied remedy is unresolved. See Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc.,
60 F.R.D. 217, 223-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act apply regardless of whether registration is required. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id. The SEC has promulgated rule lOb-5 pursuant to § 10(b). This rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
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Moreover, in resolving the issue of the jurisdictional scope of the securities
laws, the courts have focused upon the fraudulent conduct8 6 and have not
distinguished between the various substantive provisions contained in the
statutes.87 Nevertheless, an examination of these decisions reveals numerous factors which may be important to the resolution of the question of the
scope of the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
A. The Second Circuit's Approach
The vast majority of cases examining the jurisdictional reach of the securities laws has been decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Over a period of seven years, the Second Circuit decided
four cases which have received general acceptance throughout the circuits.88
The first of these cases was decided in 1968. In Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,89 an American shareholder of a Canadian corporation brought a
shareholder derivative action alleging that the corporation's directors had
violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 90 and rule 10b-5 91 in connection with
the sale of treasury shares. 92 The corporation had allegedly sold the treasury shares to its parent corporation and an American corporation at an artificially low price. 93 Although the court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's
86. See, e.g., SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356 n.2 (9th Cir. 1973);
Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1191, 1194-95 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
87. See Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Barish, the court noted
that "[tihe language of ... [the 1933 and 1934 Acts] and the statutes' purpose in regulating
securities dealings has led the courts to conclude that the jurisdictional reach of both acts is
coextensive." Id. at 1194, citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
88. See generally United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 119
(1978); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kasser,
548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473
F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
In noting the high regard traditionally accorded the decisions of the Second Circuit, Justice
Blackmun has stated that the circuit is "the 'Mother Court' in ... [the securities] area of the
law." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
89. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). Prior to Schoenbaum, at least one district court had
held that where all the essential components of a stock transaction occurred outside the United
States, § 30(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (1976), prevented the court from assuming
78 3
jurisdiction in an action under § 7(c) of that statute, id. § g( ), even though instrumentalities
of interstate commerce were utilized and the defendant was a registered broker-dealer under
§ 15, id. § 78o. See Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The court concluded
that "'jurisdiction' as used in Section 30(b) contemplates some necessary and substantial act
within the United States. This .. .section .. .was written with the present situation in mind."
Id. at 390-91. See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354,
1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 F.R.D.
385, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
92. 405 F.2d at 204.
93. Id. at 205. The plaintiff's corporation, Banff Oil Ltd., was controlled by Aquitaine,
another Canadian corporation. Id. at 204. The corporations were involved in joint oil exploration
and Banff allegedly sold its treasury shares to Aquitaine in order to help finance its share of the
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complaint for failure to state a cause of action under rule 10b-5, it concluded
that
the district court ...[had] subject matter jurisdiction over violations of the Securities Exchange Act although the transactions
which are alleged to ...[have violated] the Act ...[took] place
outside the United States, at least when the transactions involve
stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and
94
are detrimental to ...American investors.
The Schoenbaum court further reasoned that when acts committed outside a jurisdiction cause harm within it, the government is justified "in
punishing the cause of the harm as if [the actor] had been present at the
[time of the detrimental] effect." 95 The Second Circuit found the necessary
harm in the fact that the corporation had received less than fair value for its
treasury shares, thus reducing the equity of the corporation's shareholders
96
and lowering the market price of the stock on the domestic stock market.
The court concluded that "[t]his impairment of the value of American investment ... [has] a sufficiently serious effect upon United States com-

merce."

97

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Schoenbaum decision is the
manner in which the court resolved the defendant's claim that section 30(b)
of the 1934 Act 9" immunized the transaction from the operation of rule
10b-5. Section 30(b) provides, in part, that "[t]he provisions of this chapter
or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar
as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United

exploration expenses. Id. at 204-05. Banff subsequently sold treasury shares to a Delaware corporation in order to finance additional exploration and pipeline expenses. Id. at 205. The plaintiffs alleged that prior to the aforementioned share transactions, Banff's directors knew that the
company had discovered valuable oil properties but had failed to disclose this information. Id.
As a result, the market price of the stock remained low, making the purchase price for the
treasury shares, which were purchased at the market price, clearly inadequate. Id. The plaintiffs
argued that the directors and corporate purchasers of the treasury shares had conspired to sell
the shares at an artificially low price. Id. at 205-06.
94. Id. at 208. See also Seizer v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). Two years later, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
relied on Schoenbaum to dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction. See Finch v. Marathon Sec.
Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Noting that the holding in Schoenbaum only
applied to domestic investors who purchased foreign securities on American exchanges, the
Finch court concluded that "a district court is without subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of
action alleging no domestic injury or consequence, brought by a British resident against other
foreigners, for injuries sustained as a result of being fraudulently induced in a foreign country to
purchase securities of an alien corporation." Id. See also Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 F.R.D. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
95. 405 F.2d at 206, quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
96. 405 F.2d at 206-09.
97. Id. at 208-09. To substantiate this determination, the court noted "that Congress intended the ...[1934] Act to have extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic
securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities." Id.
at 206.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 4

746

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 24: p. 729

States." 99 Although on its face this section would appear to immunize the
transaction at issue in Schoenbaum, the court concluded that the provision
does not apply to "persons who engage in isolated foreign transactions." 100
It would therefore appear that the regulatory impact of section 30(b) is lim10 1
ited to the activities of broker-dealers.
Four years after Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit again addressed the
issue of the extraterritorial reach of the 1934 Act. In Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 10 2 Leasco, an American corporation, had
purchased shares of a British corporation over the London Stock Exchange. 10 3 The American plaintiff10 4 alleged that the British corporation
and its controlling shareholder, along with other defendants, had conspired
to cause the plaintiff to purchase the stock well in excess of its true value,
thus violating section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1 0 5 Rejecting the defendants' ar99. Id. Section 30(b), however, also empowers the SEC to prescribe rules applicable to
persons who "transact a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States" if
the agency believes that the exercise of such rulemaking power is necessary to prevent evasion
of the 1934 Act. Id. Section 30(a), another important aspect of the regulatory scheme, provides
in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of effecting
on an exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction in any security the issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws
of, or has its principal place of business in, a place within or subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
Id. § 78dd(a). It may be significant that a provision comparable to § 30 does not appear in the
1933 Act. Moreover, the SEC has failed to exercise its rulemaking authority pursuant to the
§ 30 grant. See Karmel, supra note 4, at 671.
100. 405 F.2d at 207-08. The court recognized that its holding with respect to § 30(b) was
contrary to the previous district court decision in Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 405 F.2d at 208. Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit concluded that "' 30(b), . . . was not meant to exempt transactions that are
conducted outside the jurisdiction of the United States unless they are part of a 'business in
securities.' " Id. See also Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969). In addition, the Schoenbaum court noted that § 30(a) was primarily
intended to confer on the SEC the power to regulate brokers and dealers who use the mails to
effect transactions in American securities on foreign exchanges. 405 F.2d at 207.
101. See 405 F.2d at 207-08.
102. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
103. Id. at 1330.
104. Leasco had actually purchased the shares through its Netherlands Antilles subsidiary.
Id. at 1332. The defendants argued that since the purchaser was technically not an American,
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1337-38. The court, however, found that the
foreign subsidiary was nothing more than the "alter ego of the American." Id. at 1338 (emphasis
supplied by the court).
105. Id. at 1330. Specifically, the plaintiffs had met in the United States and in England with
employees of the defendant corporation, at which time the defendants allegedly made numerous
misrepresentations. Id. As a result of these meetings, Leasco agreed to purchase the British
corporation through a tender offer to be made either by it or by its Netherlands Antilles subsidiary. Id. at 1332. Prior to the scheduled tender offer, the defendants allegedly misrepresented to the plaintiff that a countertakeover bid was rumored, and that the plaintiff should
begin its purchases at a date earlier than planned. Id. Leasco subsequently purchased
$22,000,000 of the defendant corporation's stock, but did not go through with the complete
tender offer. Id. at 1332-33.
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guments that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy, the Second Circuit held that the defendants' conduct in the United
10 6
States was sufficient to warrant the assumption of jurisdiction.
Significantly, in arriving at this conclusion, the Leasco court conducted
a detailed analysis of the Restatement and its pertinent provisions. 10 7 Although the court recognized that Congress may legislate beyond the limitations imposed by principles of international law, the Second Circuit was unwilling to conclude that it intended to do so when it enacted section
10(b).108 The court further noted that in defining the scope of the jurisdiction actually exercised with respect to a particular statute, the ultimate issue
remained whether Congress "meant to go to the full extent permitted" by
international law. 10 9 Analyzing the facts of the case together with the
policies underlying section 10(b), the Leasco court concluded that Congress
intended to exercise its power to the full extent permitted under rules of
international law.110
The principles developed in Schoenbaum and Leasco " were further
defined by the Second Circuit in its recent decisions in Bersch v. Drexel
106. Id. at 1337. Specifically, the court noted that "substantial misrepresentations were made
in the United States" which were "an essential link" in inducing the plaintiff to make the
purchases of the stock. Id. at 1335-37. Concerning the strength of the "link" necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the court concluded that
if defendants' fraudulent acts in the United States significantly whetted Leasco's interest
in acquiring . . . [the British] shares, it would be immaterial, from the standpoint of
foreign relations law, that the damage resulted, not from the contract whose execution
Maxwell procured in this country, but from interrelated action which he induced in England or, for that matter, which Leasco took there on its own.
Id. at 1335.
107. Id. at 1332-34, construing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (1965). For a discussion of international law principles, see notes 32-51 and
accompanying text supra.
108. 468 F.2d at 1334. The Leasco court concluded that "the language of § 10(b) . . . is much
too inconclusive to lead us to believe that Congress meant to impose rules governing conduct
throughout the world in every instance where an American company bought or sold a security."
Id.
109. Id. at 1334-35.
110. Id. at 1335-37. The court specifically based its conclusion on § 17 of the Restatement,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965).

468 F.2d at 1339. With respect to § 17, the court noted that "[w]hile the black letter seems to
require that . . . not only there should be conduct within the territory but also the conduct
relate 'to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory,' . . . [this section
appears] to be satisfied if there has been conduct [alone]." Id. at 1334 (footnote omitted). The
Second Circuit first analyzed the relationship between the antifraud provisions and the other
provisions of the securities laws. Id. at 1335. It emphasized the broad remedial purpose of the
antifraud provisions by noting that they apply regardless of whether the transaction at issue
involved registered securities or securities in organized markets. Id. at 1335-36. The court
reasoned that "[s]ince Congress thus meant § 10(b) to protect against fraud in the sale or purchase of securities whether or not these were traded on organized U.S. markets, we cannot
perceive any reason why it should have wished to limit the protection to securities of American
issuers." Id. at 1336.
111. These principles were relied upon by at least one district court in a case in which the
defendant was indicted for defrauding European investors in violation of § 17 of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q (1976). See United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In
Clark, the defendant offered debentures of a Netherlands corporation with attached warrants for
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Firestone, Inc. 112 and IIT v.Vencap, Ltd. 113 Although these cases were decided on the same day, the opinions provide interesting contrasts because
the court reached different results while utilizing the same analytical approach.
In Bersch, the plaintiff brought a class action alleging that a Canadian
corporation, 114 with the assistance of American accountants and underwriters, had failed to reveal material facts in prospectuses used in three
closely related public offerings. 115 The American plaintiff attempted to rep-

the purchase of the common stock of its American parent corporation. Id. at 132. The indictment charged that "the European offering was one part of a scheme to convey to the American
investing public a false image of the soundness .. .of ... [the parent corporation], thus artificially inflating the [American corporation's] market price." Id. at 134. Noting that the "problems
regarding extraterritoriality under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act are
essentially similar," the district court proceeded to examine the defendant's conduct in light of
the combined impact of Leasco and Schoenbaum. Id. at 133-34. The court noted that there was
sufficient evidence of fraudulent conduct in the United States to sustain jurisdiction. Id. at 134.
Moreover, it noted that the parent corporation's stock "which would be acquired upon exercise
of the warrants .. .would be traded in the United States and presumably listed on the American Stock Exchange." Id. The requirement that there be a substantial detrimental effect on
American investors was therefore satisfied. Id.
112. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
113. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
114. 519 F.2d at 977-78. The plaintiffs had purchased the common stock of I.O.S., Ltd. (lOS),
a large international sales and financial organization whose primary business involved the sale
and management of mutual funds. Id. at 978. Although organized under the laws of Canada, IOS
also "owned ten banks and finance companies, a life insurance company with subsidiaries in six
countries, a group of real estate companies, a couple of small publishing enterprises and a data
processing firm." Id. at 978 n.3.
lOS stock was primarily owned by its founder, Bernard Cornfield, and by the company's
employees. Id.at 978. An organized market did not exist for the OS shares prior to the distributions in question since the employees were prohibited from selling their stock. Id. Pressure
from its employees led IOS to "go public" before it had originally planned to do so. Id. at 979.
115. Id. at 981. The three offerings included one primary offering and two secondary offerings. Id. at 979-81. The primary offering was underwritten by six investment banking houses,
two of which were American companies with European offices. Id. at 979. The court referred to
these defendant underwriters as the "Drexel Group." Id. The 5,600,000 shares included in this
primary offering were sold by prospectus "outside the United States [and only] to foreign nationals residing in Europe, Asia and Australia." Id. at 979-80. Similarly, the second offering was
directed exclusively to non-Americans located in Canada. Id. at 980. This offering was underwritten by a Toronto investment house and was sold by prospectus pursuant to the laws of
Canada. Id.
The final offering led to the commencement of the suit in Bersch. Id. It involved a secondary offering of 3,950,000 shares to approximately 25,000 persons who were either "(1) employees
or sales associates of the Company, (2) certain clients . . . [who held] investments in managed
funds or other products of the Company, or (3) persons who . . . had a long-standing professional business relationship with the Company." Id. This offering was sold through an OS
subsidiary located in the Bahamas. Id.
The prospectuses employed in the first and third offerings stated that the shares "are not
being offered in the United States of America or any of its territories or possessions or any area
subject to its jurisdiction" and have not been registered under the United States securities laws.
Id. at 980-81. Moreover, the prospectuses for all three offerings contained four important items.
First, each offering was made for $10.00 per share. Id. at 980. Second, each offering referred to
the other two offerings. Id. Third, the prospectuses indicated that OS planned to list its stock
on various exchanges, none of which were located in the United States. Id. Finally, all the
prospectuses contained balance sheets and income statements audited by Arthur Andersen &
Co., an international accounting firm based in the United States. Id.
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resent a class consisting of thousands of investors, the overwhelming majority of whom were citizens and residents of foreign countries. 116 In a lengthy
opinion, the Second Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction existed
solely with respect to those purchasers who were residents or citizens of the
United States. 117
Recognizing that international law principles would permit the court to
exercise jurisdiction with respect to the entire class of plaintiffs, 118 Judge
Friendly, writing for a unanimous court in Bersch, noted that the precise
jurisdictional question was whether, in a predominantly foreign transaction,
"Congress would have wished the precious resources of the United States
courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than
leave the problem to foreign countries."11 9 Judge Friendly concluded that
neither Schoenbaum nor Leasco was controlling since "the precise grounds
120
on which jurisdiction was upheld in those cases" was not present.
The Second Circuit rejected the foreign plaintiffs' argument that the
defendants' conduct in the United States was sufficient to form a basis for
subject matter jurisdiction. 1 2 1 Specifically, the court determined that the
fraud was committed when the misleading prospectuses were delivered to

The misrepresentations alleged by the plaintiffs included the following: 1) the prospectuses
failed to reveal illegal activity by lOS and its officers; 2) the books and records of lOS were in a
state of chaos, thus making it impossible to properly analyze that company's financial condition;
and 3) the financial statements were false and misleading in various respects. Id. at 981.
Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged: 1) that "the underwriters 'impliedly represented to the public
that lOS was a suitable company for public ownership' when . . . they should have known that
it was not;" 2) that "during the months preceding the offering various lOS officials ... had
touted OS' prospects;" 3) that "the underwriters in the Drexel Group had failed to use due
diligence with regard to their prospectus;" and 4) that the accounting firm had "failed to observe
generally accepted accounting principles in connection with its audit." Id. As a result of these
misrepresentations, the plaintiffs purchased the stock which, shortly thereafter, became worthless. Id.
116. Id. at 977-78. The Second Circuit noted that the purchasers were predominately "citizens and residents of Canada, Australia, England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and many
other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America." Id. at 978.
117. Id. at 997. In so holding, the Second Circuit reversed that part of the district court's
decision which extended subject matter jurisdiction to all plaintiffs regardless of nationality or
residency. Id. at 983-84, 1000.
118. Id. at 985. The court stated that § 17 of the Restatement would permit the United
States to assume jurisdiction in light of the numerous activities conducted by the defendants in
this country. Id., citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 17 (1965).
119. 519 F.2d at 985. The Second Circuit reasoned that "it would be . . . erroneous to assume that the legislature always means to go to the full extent permitted [by the principles of
international law]." Id., quoting Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
120. 519 F.2d at 985. The Bersch court noted that in Schoenbaum, the stock of the corporation was listed on the American Stock Exchange and the plaintiffs were American shareholders.
Id. at 985-86. Similarly, Judge Friendly observed that in Leasco, the misrepresentations were
made in the United States. Id. at 986. Moreover, the court concluded that "neither Schoenbaum nor Leasco raised the serious problem here presented of the dubious binding effect of a
defendants' judgment (or a possibly inadequate plaintiff's judgment) on absent foreign plaintiffs
or the propriety of purporting to bind such plaintiffs by a settlement." Id. (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 989-90.
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the purchasers. 122 Since the prospectuses were mailed to the foreign purchasers from a foreign source, the Second Circuit reasoned that the conduct
in the United States was "merely preparatory" and thus could not provide
the basis for the assumption of jurisdiction. 123 Similarly, the court was not
persuaded that the general impact upon the United States economy resulting
from the collapse of the corporation in which the plaintiffs owned stock provided a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 124 Noting that a more direct effect
in the United States was required, 125 the court concluded that the "effects"

doctrine

126

does not support subject matter jurisdiction if there was no intention that the securities should be offered to anyone in the United
States, simply because in the long run there was an adverse effect
on this country's general economic interests or on American security prices ....
This means to us that there is subject matter
jurisdiction of fraudulent acts relating to securities which are committed abroad only when these result in injury to purchasers or
sellers of those securities in whom the United States has an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse affect [sic] on the
American economy or American investors generally.127
122. Id.
123. Id. at 987. The defendants' conduct in the United States included the following actions:
1) meetings by the underwriters in New York to structure the offer; 2) a New York law firm
represented the underwriters at meetings with the corporation; 3) the underwriters met with
the SEC; 4) the underwriters retained American accountants; 5) part of the prospectus was
drafted in New York and was read over the phone to the Geneva office; 6) some of the proceeds
were deposited in a New York bank pending remittance to the corporation; and 7) a draft of the
prospectus was shown to the underwriters in New York. Id. at 985 n.24. While recognizing that
foreign plaintiffs were permitted to sue in lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975),
the court concluded that there was "no reason to extend . . . [lIT] to cases where the United
States activities are merely preparatory or take the form of culpable nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison to those abroad." 519 F.2d at 987.
124. 519 F.2d at 988. Proof of the adverse economic impact in the United States of the
collapse of lOS was by way of an affidavit submitted by an associate professor of finance at the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Id. at 987. The major conclusions of the
affidavit were that the collapse of IOS caused: 1) a loss of investor confidence in American
underwriters; 2) a steep decline in the purchase of American securities by foreigners with the
attendant adverse effects on the United States balance of payments and the price of American
securities generally; and 3) a loss of confidence in the American "disclosure systems" since OS
was identified as an American company. Id. at 987-88.
125. Id. at 987-89.
126. See note 127 and accompanying text infra; notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
127. 519 F.2d at 989 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit observed that
[tihis principle [that is, the "effects doctrine"] would support subject matter jurisdiction if
a defendant, even though acting solely abroad, had defrauded investors in the United
States by mailing false prospectuses into this country ....
or if ... the number of shares
of a company traded on American exchanges was increased by a sale to insiders without
adequate consideration at least when this is imperfectly disclosed....
Id. (citations omitted). The court also noted that "[t]hese considerations are particularly important in view of the limitations in § 17(a) of the 1933 Act to acts in 'the offer or sale of any
securities' and in § 10(b) of the 1934 Act to acts 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."' Id., quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 7q(a), 78j(b) (1976). Moreover, the Second Circuit was
unwilling to combine the "conduct" in the United States with the "effects" in the United States
to provide jurisdiction where each factor, standing alone, was insufficient to sustain jurisdiction.
519 F.2d at 989-90.
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In contrast to its holding with respect to the foreign plaintiffs, the
Bersch court had little difficulty sustaining jurisdiction for the resident
American plaintiffs. 128 The Second Circuit found that the mailing of the
misleading prospectuses into the United States was a sufficiently direct effect
to warrant jurisdiction regardless of where the culpable conduct occurred.' 29 The court, however, noted that "[w]hether Congress intended that
•.. [nonresident American plaintiffs] should be entitled to obtain damages
for violation of the securities laws is a different and closer question."130
Nevertheless, the court sustained jurisdiction 131 and concluded that "[w]hile
merely preparatory activities in the United States are not enough to trigger
application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, they
32
are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resident." 1
128. 519 F.2d at 991-93.
129. Id. The Second Circuit concluded that "action [by the defendants] in the United States
is not necessary when subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on a direct effect here." Id. at
991.
130. Id. at 992. The court noted that if the defendants had not engaged in significant conduct
in the United States, the securities laws would not apply even if the purchasers were nonresident Americans and the seller was a United States corporation. Id. Specifically, it reasoned that
Congress surely did not mean the securities laws to protect the many thousands of Americans residing in foreign countries against securities frauds by foreigners acting there, and
we see no sufficient reason to believe that it would have intended otherwise simply because an American participated so long as he had done nothing in the United States.
Id. The Second Circuit, however, concluded that defendants' preparatory activities in the
United States satisfied the "significant conduct" standard. See notes 131 & 132 and accompanying
text infra.
131. Id. The Second Circuit accepted the district court's conclusion that the third offering,
which involved the nonresident Americans, would not have occurred but for the primary offering. Id. The defendants' conduct in making the first offering was therefore viewed as the basis
from which subject matter jurisdiction might be asserted. Id. For a discussion of the defendants'
activities with respect to the primary offering, see note 123 supra. The court cautioned, however, that if the causal relationship between the first and third offerings was not proved at trial,
the court would not have subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. 519 F.2d at 992-93.
132. 519 F.2d at 992. Summarizing its findings, the Second Circuit concluded that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply in the following circumstances:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to American residents in the United States
whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance occurred in this
country; and (2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to American residents abroad if,
but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the United States
have significantly contributed thereto; but (3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act)
within the United States directly caused such losses.
Id. at 993.
At least one district court in the Second Circuit has attempted to apply the Bersch holding.
In F.O.F, Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
a Canadian plaintiff alleged that an offering circular employed in the sale of an American corporation's debentures was false and misleading. Id. at 1221. Despite the fact that the purchase
took place, and the offering circular was received, outside the United States, the plaintiff contended that sufficient United States activities existed to warrant the assumption of jurisdiction.
Id. at 1222. Specifically, he noted that the offering letter was drafted and reviewed in New
York, that some sales activity occurred in the United States, and that the financing for the
offering was authorized by the corporation's board of directors in the United States. Id.
Nevertheless, the court refused to assume jurisdiction, noting that the plaintiff would have to be
classified in the third category of the Bersch holding before jurisdiction would attach. Id. at
1223. Focusing on the time of the actual occurrence of the fraud, the court concluded that it
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Unlike Bersch, its companion case, IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,1 33 involved only
foreign plaintiffs. In liT, a Luxembourg investment trust, IIT, and its
liquidators brought suit against a Bahamian "venture capital firm," Vencap,
Ltd., and an American citizen, alleging violations of the antifraud provisions
of the securities laws.' 3 4 The plaintiffs' complaint focused upon events surrounding IIT's purchase of redeemable preferred shares of Vencap. 135 Although the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the American citizenship of one of the defendants 136 and American investment in
lIT 1 37 were sufficient to sustain subject matter jurisdiction, it nonetheless
permitted the plaintiffs to maintain their suit.
Focusing on the defendants' conduct in the United States, 138 the Second Circuit posited that "[w]e do not think Congress intended to allow the
United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security
devices for export, even when ...[they] are peddled only to foreigners." 139
The Second Circuit therefore reasoned that if the plaintiffs could prove that
the fraudulent acts were committed in the United States, the securities laws
would apply.14 0 Although the court noted possible theories upon which the
was the time at which the offering circulars were distributed to the plaintiff. Id. Since this
distribution took place outside the United States, the court reasoned that under the principles
announced in Bersch, it lacked jurisdiction. Id. Moreover, it noted that "[tihe fact that the
issues . . .are American is of little independent significance." id.
133. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
134. Id. at 1003-04.
135. Id. at 1003-11. After approximately nine months of negotiations, lIT agreed to purchase
redeemable shares of Vencap. Id. at 1003-07. Vencap had been organized three months earlier
primarily through the efforts of Richard C. Pistell, a United States citizen residing in the
Bahamas. Id. at 1004-05. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that Vencap committed fraud when it
took funds received as a result of the purchase of the redeemable share by lIT and converted
them to the personal use of Pistell through the facilities of Vencap's New York office. Id. at
1008-11.
136. Id. at 1016. In particular, the court noted that Congress is reluctant to exercise its
authority to regulate the conduct of American citizens in other parts of the world, and concluded that "[ilt ... [is] simply unimaginable that Congress would have wished the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws to apply if, for example, Pistell while in London had done all
the acts here charged and had defrauded only European investors." Id.
137. Id. The plaintiffs argued that since lIT had American fundholders, Pistell's activities
caused a significant effect in the United States, thus warranting the assumption of jurisdiction.
Id. Although controversy existed as to the exact amount of American investment in the fund,
the court placed the maximum figure at .5% of the total. Id. The Second Circuit concluded that
this amount was not the "substantial effect" required by the principles of international law. Id.
at 1017. See note 45 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, the court emphasized that unlike
Bersch, the fraud in liT was perpetrated upon the trust in which the Americans had invested
and not upon the American investors themselves. 519 F.2d at 1016.
138. 519 F.2d at 1017-18. The lIT court focused primarily upon the defendants postsale conduct in the United States since it found that the presale conduct did not produce a sufficient
basis to sustain jurisdiction. Id. at 1018. Specifically, the court concluded that "the exchange by
the American attorneys for lIT and Vencap of drafts of the purchase agreement [for the redeemable shares] . .. simply formalized what seems to have been a deal worked out in the
Bahamas." Id.
139. Id. at 1017.
140. Id. The court explicitly limited its holding when it observed that its "ruling on the basis
of jurisdiction is limited to the perpetration of the fraudulent acts themselves and does not
extend to mere preparatory activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of
the activity was to be performed in foreign countries." Id. at 1018. (Emphasis added).
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defendants' post sale conduct might support jurisdiction, it remanded for a
determination of "whether the district judge considered ...[the activity in
the United States] to be within Rule 10b-5." 141
B. The Third Circuit's View
Until 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
had not addressed the issue of the extraterritorial reach of the securities
laws. 142 In successive years, however, two cases were decided which involved transnational securities transactions and allegations of fraud. While
both cases refer to the Second Circuit's precedent, at least one appears to
provide a more expansive view of the jurisdictional scope of the securities
laws.
In Straub v. Vaisman & Co. ,143 a foreign corporation sued a New Jersey broker-dealer for fraudulently inducing it to purchase the securities of an
American corporation which went bankrupt less than one month after the
purchase. 1 " Noting that the transaction was not "predominantly foreign,"
the Third Circuit held that when an American broker, by failing to disclose
material information, induces a foreign corporation to purchase American
securities which are traded on an American exchange, the foreign plaintiffs

Moreover, the Second Circuit recognized that the "distinction is a fine one." Id. It reasoned
that such a line must be drawn, however, to prevent the securities laws from applying in every
instance where some activity has occurred in the United States. Id.
141. Id. at 1018. The theories suggested by the lIT court focused upon the defendant's conduct subsequent to the sale of the securities. Id. Specifically, the court noted that if Vencap
fraudulently represented the intent to operate as a bona fide "venture capital firm" and, after
receiving the plaintiffs' investment, used its New York office to convert the funds to Pistell's
personal use, it was arguable that the fraud was not committed until Vencap engaged in the
conduct in the United States. Id. at 1013, 1018.
142. Prior to 1976, however, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania had examined the extraterritorial issue twice. See Recaman v. Barish, 408 F.
Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Selas of America (Nederland) v. Selas Corp. of America, 365 F.
Supp. 1382 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In Selas, the court permitted a foreign corporation and its Dutch
employees to maintain a rule 10b-5 action against its parent, an American corporation, noting
that "it ... [was] clear that sufficient conduct took place within the U.S. . . . and that the
transaction in question .. .[had] a significant impact on the American securities markets. Id. at
1386. The court noted that the agreement providing for the transfer of the shares was made in
the United States and that the fraudulent acts occurred in the United States. Id. In contrast, in
Recaman, the district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in an action brought
by South Americans against a Bahamian investment trust fund since there was insufficient conduct in the United States and little impact on American investors or the domestic securities
markets. 408 F.Supp. at 1197-202.
143. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
144. Id. at 593-94. The defendant had recommended that the plaintiff purchase the securities
on several occasions prior to the transaction in question. Id. at 594. In late 1972, the defendant
telexed the plaintiff and recommended the purchase of 10,000 shares of Mark I Offset (Mark I),
an American corporation. Id. The defendant, however, failed to disclose that it was a financial
consultant to Mark I and was aware of the company's imminent bankruptcy. Id. Moreover, the
defendant failed to disclose that it held a controlling interest in Mark I and that the market
price of the securities was less than the recommended purchase price. Id. The district court
judge found the defendant's "conduct 'shocking to the conscience of the court."' Id.
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may sue under the securities laws. 145 Moreover, the court noted that "on
policy grounds the interest of the United States in regulating the conduct of
its brokers-dealers in this country and enhancing world confidence in its
securities market is ample justification for applying the securities laws." 146
While Straub is consistent with the prior decisions of the Second Circuit, the most recent Third Circuit case, SEC v. Kasser,147 arguably goes
one step further. In Kasser, the SEC brought an action against a Canadian
corporation, an American corporation, and their controlling shareholder."14
The only victim of the alleged fraud was a Canadian corporation and the
49
fraudulent scheme had a limited, if any, impact on domestic markets.'
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that the defendant's conduct in the
5
United States provided a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction,' 1
Specifically, the court concluded that "the federal securities laws ... grant
jurisdiction in transnational securities cases where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country." 151

145. Id. at 595. The Third Circuit refused to provide a complete analysis of the extraterritorial issue, noting that "[b]ecause the difficulties inherent in any attenuation of jurisdiction are
not seriously implicated in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe it desirable to
discuss at length the transnational scope of the federal securities laws." Id. (footnote omitted).
Moreover, it concluded that "[w]herever the jurisdictional line is to be drawn," the facts in
Straub indicated that jurisdiction existed "under either the Second Circuit's formulation or that
of the ALI Proposed Federal Securities Code." Id., citing AL FED. SEC. CODE § 1604 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1974).
146. 540 F.2d at 595.
147. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
148. Id. at 110. Defendant Kasser controlled a Canadian corporation, Churchill Forest Industries (CFI), and a Delaware corporation, River Sawmills Company (River). Id. at 111. According
to the SEC, Kasser fraudulently induced a corporation which was wholly owned by the province
of Manitoba, Canada-Manitoba Development Fund (Fund)-to make loans to CFI and River.
Id. at 110-11. In addition, the Fund purchased CFI and River debentures in reliance upon
Kasser's misrepresentations. Id. at 111. Kasser's alleged misrepresentations consisted primarily
of a promise that in return for the loans and debenture sales, he would invest additional equity
capital in CFI and River. Id. Instead of making the promised investments, however, Kasser
allegedly circulated the proceeds, using the Fund's money to make the required additional
investments. Id. The fraud was accomplished by "laundering" the loan proceeds through corporations and bank accounts in the United States, Canada, and Switzerland. Id. Moreover, Kasser
was alleged to have diverted some of the loan proceeds to his own personal use. Id. As a result
of the aforementioned scheme, CFI and River went bankrupt. Id.
149. Id. at 110, 112.
150. Id. at 114-15. The activities conducted in the United States included
(1) various negotiations; (2) execution of one of the investment contracts in New York; (3)
utilization of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g., telephones and mails) to
further the scheme; (4) incorporation bf defendant companies in the United States, or at
least the establishment of corporate offices; and (5) use of the New York office of a Swiss
bank as a conduit for moneys received from the Fund. Other activities . . . included (1)
maintenance of books and records in this country; (2) drafting of agreements executed
elsewhere; and (3) transmittal of proceeds from the transactions to and from the United
States.
Id. at 111 (footnotes omitted). Notably, the district court had stated "that the intranational
conduct of the defendants here consisted merely of 'miscellaneous acts"' and dismissed the
SEC's claim based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 112, quoting SEC v. Kasser,
391 F.Supp. 1167, 1176 (D.N.J. 1975).
151. 548 F.2d at 114 (emphasis added).
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The Kasser court relied upon Straub, IT, and Bersch to support its
conclusion. 152 Although the court recognized that Straub was distinguishable in that Straub involved the securities of an American corporation and
the domestic activities of the Straub defendants may have been greater, the
Third Circuit concluded that Straub at least stood for the proposition that
"conduct in this country, standing alone, is enough for jurisdiction
to attach
under the federal securities laws." 153 Proceeding under the "conduct
theory," 154 the court reasoned that it was not a condition precedent to
statutory liability that the fraud be accomplished. 1 55 Moreover, it determined that the defendants' activities in the United States were sufficient to
satisfy the Second Circuit's requirement that the defendant's conduct go
5 6
beyond "mere preparation."1
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Third Circuit's opinion in
Kasser was its treatment of the prior decisions of the Second Circuit. While
recognizing that liT and Bersch were the leading cases on the issue of jurisdiction with respect to transnational securities fraud, it appears that the
Kasser court did not accord substantial weight to the express limitations of these
decisions. 157 With respect to the liT limitation that jurisdiction based upon
conduct in the United States extends only when the "perpetration of the
fraudulent acts themselves" occur in this country, 158 the Third Circuit responded that it was more significant that the domestic activities of Kasser
went beyond "mere preparation." 15 9
Similarly, although the domestic activities engaged in by the defendants
in Kasser were analogous to those involved in Bersch,160 in which jurisdiction over the claims of the foreign plaintiffs was denied, 161 the Third Circuit
distinguished the cases. Specifically, the court found that "the execution of a
key investment contract in New York as well as the maintenance of the

152. Id. at 115.
153. Id. at 113 (footnote omitted).
154. See note 44 and accompanying text supra. The "conduct theory" is based upon the right
of a state, under the principles of international law, to regulate conduct within its territory
regardless of where the consequences of that conduct occur. Id. See also note 46 supra.
155. 548 F.2d at 114. The Third Circuit adopted a very expansive view of the scope of the
federal securities laws when it noted: "The securities acts expressly apply to 'foreign commerce,'
thereby evincing a Congressional intent for a broad jurisdictional scope for the 1933 and 1934
Acts." Id. (footnote omitted). It may be significant, however, that the Third Circuit was not
confronted with a private damage action in Kasser. Id. at 114 n.22.
156. Id. at 115.
157. See id. at 113-15.
158. Id. at 114, quoting lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975).
159. 548 F.2d at 114-15. The Third Circuit relied in part on the lIT court's statement that it
did "not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for' manufacturing fraudulent securities devices for export, even when these are only peddled to foreigners."
Id., quoting lIT v. Vencap, Ltd,, 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975). See text accompanying
note 139 supra. It appears significant that the Kasser court never focused upon the fact that the
fraud itself was not committed in the United States as required by lIT. 548 F.2d at 114-15. See
note 140 & 141 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 123 & 150 supra.
161. For a discussion of Bersch, see notes 114-32 and accompanying text supra.
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records in this country by both American and foreign corporations" were
examples of greater United States based conduct. 16 2 Finally, the Third Circuit concluded that "[f]rom a policy perspective . . . we believe that there
are sound rationales for asserting jurisdiction." 163
C. Other Judicial Decisions

In addition to the major decisions of the Second and Third Circuits,
three other circuit courts of appeals have decided cases involving the extra-

territorial application of the securities laws.16 4 Despite the varying factual
postures of these cases, the general principles announced and developed by
the Second Circuit were substantially followed.
In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction existed under the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act despite the fact that only European investors were

162. 548 F.2d at 115. The Third Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that its activities
in the United States did not directly cause the losses to the foreign corporation, as required by
Bersch. Id. See notes 122 & 123 and accompanying text supra.
The Third Circuit concluded that "it is evident that the defendants' conduct occurring
within the borders of this nation was essential to the plan to defraud the Fund." 548 F.2d at
115.
163. 548 F.2d at 116. The Third Circuit noted three policy considerations which supported
its conclusions. Id. First, the court cautioned that should it deny jurisdiction, defrauders would
be encouraged to use the United States as a base for fraudulent schemes. Id. Second, it was
suggested that "a holding of no jurisdiction might induce reciprocal responses on the part of
other nations." Id. Finally, the Third Circuit reasoned that the purpose of the securities
laws-to provide a high standard of conduct in securities transactions -would be served by an
affirmative finding of jurisdiction since such a determination would "enhance the ability of the
SEC to police vigorously the conduct of securities dealings within the United States." Id.
164. See notes 165-69 and accompanying text infra. In addition to the district court decisions
in the Second and Third Circuits discussed previously, see notes 94, 132 & 142 supra, at least
two other district courts have examined the issue of the extraterritorial scope of the securities
laws. See Garner v. Pearson, 374 F.Supp. 591 (M.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental
Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). While recognizing that "[s]ection 10(b) was not
intended to impose rules of conduct on transactions occurring outside the United States when
the only connection with the United States is the citizenship of the purchaser or seller," the
Garner court nevertheless sustained a jurisdictional claim by liquidators of'a Bahamian bank on
the ground that the fraudulent scheme had a significant impact on American investors. Garner
v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. at 599. The scheme involved a complex set of transactions which were
designed to appropriate the assets of the bank to the personal use and benefit of its former
officers and directors. Id. at 594-95. The district court noted that the significant impact on
American investors was evidenced by the fact that 50% of the bank's depositors were American
citizens, instrumentalities of interstate commerce were utilized, and some of the fraudulent
transactions in the scheme took place in the United States. Id. at 599.
As in Garner, the district court in Gulf Intercontinental ruled affirmatively on a jurisdictional claim. SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. at 994-95. In Gulf Intercontinental, the SEC sought an injunction against the Canadian defendant to prevent further
violations of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. Id. at 989. The court concluded that
jurisdiction existed since numerous offers had been made within the United States by means of
newspaper advertisements. Id. at 994. The district court reasoned that "[iut is sufficient for
subject matter jurisdiction under the Acts that such offers be made within the United States
without a showing that such offers were accepted by actual sale, or that the alleged misrepresentations were in fact successful in inducing the sale of such securities by reliance thereon."
Id. at 994-95 (footnotes omitted).
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defrauded. 165 The court based its conclusion upon the defendant's conduct
within the United States. 166 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit has found a defendant's conduct within the United
States dispositive in an antifraud claim brought by American plaintiffs against
a Canadian corporation. 167 Unlike the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has decided cases in
which both the "conduct" 168 and the "effects" 169 theories were at least partially utilized to sustain subject matter jurisdiction.

165. United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 119 (1978).
Cook was convicted by the lower court for violating the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act and
the federal mail fraud statutes. 573 F.2d at 282. His conviction resulted from a scheme in which
European investors received false advertisements in Europe extolling the virtues of American
oil investments. Id. Once the European investor purchased an interest, a contract was signed in
Europe and returned to the United States for recording. Id. at 283. Proceeds received from
later investors were used to pay off earlier investors under the guise that the investments were
producing a return. Id. Eventually, the entire scheme collapsed. Id.
166. 573 F.2d at 283 & n.4. Noting that schemes with marginal American connections raised
difficult questions with respect to jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it would "leave
for another day an attempt to formulate the outer perimeter of American jurisdiction. The
present scheme is so far within the jurisdiction of the American courts as to give us little
pause." Id. at 283. The conduct relied upon by the court in concluding that it had jurisdiction
over the case included the following activities: 1) Cook formulated and conducted his scheme
from Dallas, Texas; 2) his actions in Texas were hardly preparatory; 3) American securities were
involved in the scheme; 4) the money for the scheme was repatriated; and 5) some investors
were defrauded in the United States. Id.
167. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). In Travis, a class action
was brought by shareholders of a Canadian corporation, alleging fraud in a tender offer by
another Canadian corporation. Id. at 518. The shareholders were American citizens who resided
in the United States. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that they were led to believe that if they retained
their stock until after a tender offer was made to Canadian shareholders, the corporation would
make them a similar offer. Id. at 519. The subsequent offer was never made, and the plaintiffs
were allegedly injured when they were forced to sell their shares at a lower price than they
would have received had they sold when the initial tender offer was announced. Id. The Eighth
Circuit stated that the "essential issue ... [was] whether the defendants' conduct in the United
States was of such significance to subject them to the jurisdiction of the District Court." Id. at
524. Relying on Leasco, the court answered the question affirmatively, and cited the following
domestic activity: 1) a letter mailed by the President of the corporation to the American
shareholders assuring them that although the tender offer was being restricted to Canadian
shareholders, their investment position would be protected; 2) a copy of this same letter mailed
to the plaintiffs' attorney; 3) phone calls made by the plaintiffs from St. Louis to the corporate
officers in Canada during which the alleged subsequent tender offer was discussed; 4) phone
conversations between the plaintiffs' attorney and an officer of a New Jersey based subsidiary of
the defendant corporation regarding tax handling of the subsequent offer; 5) a letter mailed from
Canada to St. Louis assuring the plaintiffs that the tax aspects of the exchange were being
examined; 6) a phone call from Canada to St. Louis informing the plaintiffs that the subsequent
tender offer would not be made and that the plaintiffs would have to sell their shares to the
corporation which had gained control as a result of the tender offer, or the corporation would
withdraw its support of the market for the stock; and 7) the subsequent sale of the plaintiffs'
stock in St.Louis. Id. at 524-26.
168. SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973). The SEC charged
United Financial Group, Inc. with violating §§ 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the 1933 Act, § 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, and rule 10b-5. Id. at 356 n.2. The alleged fraudulent activity arose within the
context of the offer and sale of shares in mutual funds of various investment companies incorporated in foreign countries. Id. at 355-56. Although the defendants argued that the offers and
sales had been confined to foreign purchasers, the court found evidence to the contrary. Id. at
356. Specifically, the defendants' conduct which the Ninth Circuit found controlling included: 1)
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D. The Private Offering Exemption
Although section 5 of the 1933 Act may apply to foreign offerings of
securities, a few judicial and administrative decisions 170 have indicated that,
in some circumstances, a foreign offering of securities might be exempt from
the registration requirements as a transaction "not involving any public offering." 171 Illustrative of this result is the decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in SEC v. North American
Research & Development Corp. 172
In North American, the court confronted an elaborate scheme which
was designed to defraud American investors. 17 3 A major aspect of the
the sale of shares to an American serviceman overseas; 2) the sale of shares to an American
citizen temporarily living abroad; 3) the sale of shares to an American citizen employed overseas
without informing her of purchase restrictions; 4) the offer to exchange shares made to an
American citizen and addressed to his residence in the United States; 5) the control of the
foreign companies by a United States corporation; and 6) the use of the mails and other facilities
of interstate commerce to arrange meetings and to prepare and distribute prospectuses. Id.
Despite this partial reliance on the defendants' conduct, the Ninth Circuit also noted the significant "effect" that those activities had on American investors. Id. at 357. The court thus
appears to have relied on both the "conduct" and "effect" theories. Id. at 356-57.
169. Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977). In Des Brisay, the foreign
plaintiffs brought a class action alleging fraudulent conduct in the takeover of a Canadian corporation by an American corporation. Id. at 134, 136. The named plaintiffs included a Canadian
citizen, who was a former shareholder of the Canadian corporation, and a Canadian trust company. Id. at 134. In substance, the questioned transaction involved the exchange of the American corporation's shares for the assets of its Canadian counterpart. Id. at 135. The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the "Securities Acts ... [have] been held to embrace the protection of [the]
'domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities."' Id., quoting Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), modified on
other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). The Des
Brisay court therefore concluded that subject matter jurisdiction was appropriate since the defendant's stock was listed and traded on an American exchange and the foreign transaction
adversely affected "not only the plaintiffs but also the American market in that corporation's
securities." 549 F.2d at 135. The court reasoned that such a result was necessary in order to
"protect the integrity of the domestic securities markets in a particular stock." Id.
170. See generally SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248, 255-56
(D. Utah 1958) (transfer of shares to limited number of Canadian residents did not bring offering within private placement exemption where defendants maintain view toward public distribution in United States); In re Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347, 366 (1960) (no exemption
available where unregistered shares were sold to European investors who intended to resell
them in United States).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1976). See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
172. 280 F. Supp. 106, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).
173. 280 F. Supp. at 112-20. The primary objective of the scheme was for the promoter to
gain control of a "shell" corporation and market its shares on the over the counter market. Id. at
112. Prior to the promoter's acquisition of control, the shell corporation's transfer agent, who
was also a director and the shell corporation's secretary-treasurer, purchased shares from a
number of the corporation's shareholders. Id, at 115. These shares, along with 200,000 shares
acquired at the time control was transferred, were sold to other participants in the scheme, who
transferred them immediately to Canadian brokers. Id. A similar procedure was employed for
an additional 553,000 shares that were purchased from shareholders of the "shell" corporation
after the promoter had acquired control. Id. Once the shares were "safely" in Canada, the
promoter and his associates created a demand for the "shell" corporation's stock by publishing
false "progress reports" in the United States. Id. at 117-19. Ultimately, the shares were sold in
the United States to American investors. Id. at 118-20.
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scheme was the distribution of unregistered shares to Canadian brokers followed by a redistribution of the shares in the United States.1 74 Some of the
defendants advanced the argument that "since they sold North American
shares to . . . [Canadian brokers] in Toronto, Canada, they . . . [were] entitled to an exemption on the ground that the shares were purchased solely
with a view toward distribution into Canada." 17 Rejecting this contention,
the district court noted that
[w]here an offering is made to persons exclusively outside of the
United States, it is exempt from § 5 because § 4(1) [now § 4(2)]
exempting transactions "not involving any public offering" had as
its purpose to require registrationonly as to those public offerings
that were made in the United States. . . . On the other hand,
where an offering is made to dealers outside the United States who
are purchasing with a view to distribution into the United States,
or into both the United States and Canada, the exemption is in-

applicable.176
Since the court found that the evidence clearly indicated that the Canadian
brokers purchased the shares with a view toward distribution in the United
177
States, the defendants could not utilize the private offering exemption.
V.

THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE

In an effort to reform and modify existing securities regulation, 1 7 the
American Law Institute has drafted and proposed the adoption of a Federal
Securities Code. 179 The pertinent provision addressing the extraterritorial
scope of the Code is section 1905,180 a subsection of which defines the general conditions under which the substantive provisions of the Code operate.' 8 ' The broad reach of section 1905(a), however, is limited by the exceptions to jurisdiction enumerated in section 1905(b).' 8 2 Moreover, section
1905(c) grants the SEC rulemaking authority to provide for the applicability
or inapplicability of the Code in specific instances.' 8 3 Finally, the remainder of section 1905 deals with foreign bribes,'8 4 consent to personal jursidiction,' 8 5 and actions in foreign courts. 18 6

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 115-20.
Id. at 123.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id.
See note 14 supra.
ALl FED. SEC, CODE (Proposed Official Draft March 1978) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
Id. § 1905.

181. Id. § 1905(a).
182. Id. § 1905(b). See notes 194-96 and accompanying text infra.
183. CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(c). See notes 199-207 and accompanying text infra.
184. CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(d). This section of the Code is similar to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 9
78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff, 78q(b).
185. CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(e).
186. Id. § 1905(0.
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The principal approach of the Code is to provide for a broad grant of
jurisdiction while relying on the SEC to promulgate rules "to tailor [the]
expression of power to the appropriate policy considerations." 187 All grants
of authority are therefore limited solely by principles of international
law.'18 Within this limitation, the Code provides specific jurisdictional
grants with respect to offers, sales, and purchases of securities; inducements
not to buy or sell a security; proxy solicitations and other circulars sent to
security holders; tender offers and recommendations for or against tender
offers; and activities of investment advisors-as long as the aforementioned
conduct takes place within the United States even though it is initiated outside of the United States.' 8 9 In addition, the antifraud provisions of the
Code apply to these activities even if the act "is initiated within the United
States although it occurs outside the United States." 190 Finally, the Code
restates international law principles by providing for jurisdiction in cases
where
any other prohibited, required, or actionable conduct (i) whose
constituent elements occur to a substantial (but not necessarily
predominant) extent within the United States or (ii) some or all of
whose constituent elements occur outside the United States but
cause a substantial effect within it (of a type that this Code is designed to prevent) as a direct and reasonably foreseeable result of
the conduct. 19'
Although much of the Code is similar to the existing law on subject
matter jurisdiction as interpreted by the courts, 19 2 there are two major
187. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1604, Comment 1(c), at 164-65 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974) [hereinafter cited as THIRD DRAFT]. Section 1604 was the predecessor to § 1905 of the Proposed
Official Draft. Except for some minor changes made in the Fifth Draft, both sections contain
the same language. The comments accompanying the Third Draft would therefore appear to be
directly applicable to an analysis of § 1905. Moreover, the comments accompanying the Third
Draft provide the only discussion of the objectives of the extraterritoriality provision.
According to the drafters, the Code's approach to the extraterritoriality issue "recognizes
that it is essential to distinguish between power in the international law sense and policy." Id. at
164 (emphasis in original). Among the policies addressed in the comments is the "risk . . . that
excessive extraterritoriality might damage the country's trade position." Id., Comment 10(a), at
170.
188. See CODE, supra note 179 §§ 1905(a)-(c). The drafters noted that a possible approach to
the extraterritoriality issue was to retain the current statutes' approach by adopting language
similar to § 30 of the 1934 Act. THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment 1(a), at 160.
The drafters rejected this suggestion, however, noting that § 30 is "both equivocal and illogical." Id. at 161. At least one commentator has applauded the drafter's decision not to follow
§ 30. See Karmel, supra note 4, at 672.
189. CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(a)(1)(A). The drafters note that "[p]resumably everyone
would agree that the making of an offer from another country into the United States by mail or
telephone is subject to . . . §§ 5 and 17(a) even though neither the seller nor an agent of the
seller sets foot in the United States." THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment 3(b), at
165 (citations omitted). They reach the same conclusion with respect to proxy solicitations and
tender requests. Id., Comment 3(c), at 166.
190. CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(a)(2).
191. Id. § 1905(a)(1)(D). See also THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment l(b), at
161-64.
192. See generally THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment 1(c), at 161-69; Karmel,
supra note 4, at 669-70.
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changes which warrant discussion. 193 One major innovation provided by the
Code is the enumeration of situations under which the Code's substantive
provisions do not apply. 194 For example, except for its antifraud provisions,
the Code does not apply to any of the acts listed in section 1905(a) when the
act occurs outside the United States even though it was initiated within the
United States. 195 Presumably, this provision removes from the purview of
the Code most foreign distributions when the actual offer and sale are made
outside of the United States. 196 This provision therefore represents a significant recognition by the drafters of the Code that the regulatory and disclosure functions of the securities laws do not require a like result in the
area of extraterritorial application. 197 The courts have heretofore failed to
make this crucial distinction under existing legislation. 19
A second major change made by the Code concerns the authority of the
SEC to promulgate rules defining the Code's extraterritorial application.' 99
Under current law, only sections 12(g)(3), 20 0 30201 and 7(f)202 of the 1934
Act provide for rulemaking authority in this area. None of these sections,
however, is as broad as the Code provision. 20 3 Under the Code, the SEC
may generally adopt a rule providing for the applicability or inapplicability of
193. In addition to the two major changes discussed in the text, it is important to note that
adoption of the Code's unitary approach to the securities laws would eliminate the need to
examine numerous provisions of various statutes in order to resolve the extraterrritoriality issue.
The courts, however, have not found it necessary to distinguish between the securities laws on
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See note 87 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, the
Code specifically addresses situations in which the registration requirements would not apply to
foreign brokers, dealers, and investment advisers. See CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(b)(2)-(3).
194. CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(b).
195. Id. § 1905(b)(1). Although the drafters conceded that international law principles would
permit the United States to exercise jurisdiction in these situations, they concluded that "policy
does not require that Part V [successor to the registration and prospectus provisions of the 1933
Act] extend as far as it might under international law." THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604,
Comment 4, at 167 (emphasis in original). Section 1604(b) was therefore "an elaboration of this
policy, subject to rules that the SEC might provide otherwise under § 1604(c)(1) [§ 1905(c) of
Proposed Official Draft]." Id.
196. See CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(b)(1).
197. Id. See also Karmel, supra note 4, at 695. It is interesting to note that the Code does not
distinguish between Americans living abroad and foreign nationals for the purposes of §
1905(b)(1). Although the comments are silent on the issue, the Code appears to depart from the
SEC's position that registration is required when offers are made to Americans living abroad.
For a discussion of the SEC's position, see Release 4708, supra note 10,
1362, at 2124. Of
course, the SEC could always adopt a rule pursuant to § 1905(c) of the Code in order to
maintain its current position. See CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(c). But see THIRD DRAFT, supra
note 187, § 1604, Comment 10(f), at 173-74 (mere nationality of victim is insufficient basis for
exercise of jurisdiction under international law principles).
198. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
199. See CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(c).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976).
201. Id. § 78dd.
202. Id. § 78g.
203. See THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment 1, at 160-65. Section 12 (g)(3 )
authorizes the SEC to exempt, by rule, foreign issuers from the registration requirements of the
1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976). Section 7(f) permits the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to exempt foreigners from the application of the 1934 Act's margin requirements. Id. § 78g. For a discussion of § 30, see notes 98-101 and accompanying text supra.
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any provision of the Code. 20 4 The only limitation on its power is that the
rule be "[w]ithin the limits of international law ... and in the light of the
205
significance . . . within the United States of particular acts or conduct."
While current judicial decisions indicate that the mere nationality of the
defendant is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction under the
the SEC to promulgate a rule
securities laws, 20 6 the Code would permit
20 7
which would produce such a result.
VI.

DISCUSSION-POSSIBLE SCOPE OF SECTION 5

In light of the varying factual patterns presented in the cases, it is difficult to reach firm conclusions as to the extraterritorial reach of the 1933
Act's registration requirements. Whatever guidance is provided by the decisions is limited by two important considerations. First, no court has
examined the extraterritoriality issue when the sole question was registration.
Most courts have focused upon the egregious conduct of the defendant with
respect to the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. 20
As a result,
there has been little discussion of the policies for or against extending the
registration requirements into the area of transnational securities transactions. Since the extraterritoriality issue is primarily one of policy, 20 9 varying
2 10
considerations might operate to produce different results.
Even if the case law is determinative of the extraterritorial reach of
section 5, a second consideration must be noted. The Third Circuit's recent
204. CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(c). In addition, the Code provides that the SEC shall
enact rules to determine the extent to which the "issuer registration" provisions of the Code
apply to foreign issuers. Id. § 1905(c)(2).
205. Id. § 1905(c). The drafters noted that -§ 1604(c)(1) does not give the ... [SEC] a completely free hand. Since its rules must be consistent with . . . international law . . . they will
not bind the courts if they plainly go beyond international law." THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187,
§ 1604, Comment 10(e), at 172. As an example, the drafters noted that "the mere nationality of
the victim as distinct from the actor is not enough according to the Restatement." id., Comment
10(f), at 173-74, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1965). Nevertheless, the drafters concluded that since "international law . . . [is] frequently at least as vague as the domestic variety, the courts may be expected to defer within
reason to definitional rules designed to flesh out § 1604(a) and (b) [now §§ 1905(a),(b)], especially § 1604(a)(1)(D) [now 91905(a)(1)(D)], in the context of the securities world." THIRD
DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment 10(e), at 172-73.
206. See note 136 and accompanying text supra.
207. See THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187 § 1604, Comment 10(f), at 173. At least one commentator criticized the Code's extraterritoriality provisions while they were in draft stage. See
Karmel, supra note 4, at 670. The criticisms focused upon the drafters' failure to resolve the
question of "what the United States public policy is or should be in applying federal securities
laws to activities in foreign countries." Id. Specifically, the author questioned the broad
rulemaking authority delegated to the SEC, contending that the agency lacks the expertise "to
be the arbiter of the extent to which the securities laws will be given extraterritorial application." Id. While the SEC views public policy from the vantage point of the public investor, Ms.
Karmel noted that "[i]n the transnational and international security markets ... public policy
should be viewed in the context of foreign and international monetary policy objectives." Id.
208. See notes 83-169 and accompanying text supra.
209. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.),- cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977);
THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment 1(c), at 164.
210. See Karmel, supra note 4, at 670, 691-95.
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decision in Kasser appears to signify a more expansive approach to the application of the securities laws. 211 It remains to be seen whether other courts
will accept the Third Circuit's analysis 212 in lieu of the more limited approach adopted by the Second Circuit. 213 If accepted, the Kasser opinion
may be the judicial vehicle by which the SEC's expansive view of the reach
2 14
of the securities laws is recognized.
Despite these qualifications, it is possible to identify major areas
wherein the applicability of the registration requirements of section 5 can be
determined. Under any view, it seems clear that an offer or sale of securities
in the United States would fall within the purview of section 5 and, therefore, require registration unless an exemption is available. 215 This result
appears true regardless of whether the issuer is domiciled in the United
States or is a foreign based enterprise.2 1 6 Moreover, registration would be
required even though the purchaser is a foreign national who is living in or
visiting the United States. In such a situation, jurisdiction would be based
primarily upon the defendant's conduct, i.e., the offer or sale, within the
United States.

2 17

Unlike distributions in the United States, it is more difficult to predict
when registration is required for distributions made outside the country.
Both the SEC and the courts appear to agree that the primary focus of the
securities laws is on the protection of American investors.2 18 It would
therefore appear as though the residency and nationality of the purchaser are
the most important factors. Significantly, the courts have utilized the same
analytical approach regardless of whether the SEC brings suit or the plaintiff
2 19
is an individual purchaser.
211. For a discussion of Kasser, see notes 147-63 and accompanying text supra. See also
Loomis & Grant, supra note 2, at 10-11; 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 795 (1978).
212. For a statement of the Third Circuit's conclusion in this area, see text accompanying
note 151 supra.
213. For a summary of the limitations adopted by the Second Circuit, see notes 130, 132, 136
& 140 and accompanying text supra.
214. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra. See also Karmel, supra note 4, at 694; Loomis
& Grant, supra note 2, at 17-18.
215. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963);
THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment 3(b), at 165.
216. See SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963); notes
102-10 and accompanying text supra.
217. See notes 133-41 and accompanying text supra. See also Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.,
473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326
(2d Cir. 1972). If the offer and/or sale were made in the United States to a foreigner who then
returned to his country and subsequently received the security, the exercise of jurisdiction
would still be appropriate. See notes 133-41 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (question of
sales to foreigners within the United States left open but analysis suggests that jurisdiction
would be appropriate).
218. See notes 58-60, 132 & 137 and accompanying text supra. See also SEC v. United
Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973). But see SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109,
114-16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
219. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Loomis &
Grant, supra note 2, at 10-11, 18-19. It is also arguable that the Kasser court applied a less
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Registration appears to be required in all cases where sales are made to
Americans residing in the United States so long as the issuer is engaged in
interstate commerce.2 2 0 Arguably, it may not be a defense that the actual
offer and sale was completed outside the country, since jurisdiction may be
premised upon the direct effect in the United States caused by the defendant's conduct abroad. 22 1 On the other hand, where the purchasers are
Americans living abroad, subject matter jurisdiction exists only if there is
some measure of conduct in the United States. 2 2 2 Theoretically, if the entire distribution could be structured outside of the United States, registration may not be required. The conduct required by the courts when the
purchaser is a nonresident American is not substantial, however, and it appears to include most activities leading up to the offer and/or sale without
registration .223
It is therefore submitted that most, if not all, domestic issuers would
probably satisfy the conduct requirement since limited activities in corporate
headquarters may be enough to sustain jurisdiction.2 2 4 In contrast, a

stringent standard to the SEC action before it because the Commission was seeking injunctive
relief. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 n.22 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
220. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 990-93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975). The interstate commerce requirement is liberally construed in order to fulfill
the remedial purpose of the statute. See United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 783-84 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 946 (1969); United States v. Hughes, 195 F. Supp. 795
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). See generally SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 357 & n.4
(9th Cir. 1973).
221. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 990-92, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), modified on
other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). It
should be noted that both Bersch and Schoenbaum may be distinguished from the situation in
which an American citizen residing in the United States is sold a nonlisted domestic or foreign
security outside the country and then transports the security with him when he returns home.
In Bersch, the defendants had engaged in some conduct in the United States, whereas the
hypothetical presupposes no conduct in this country. Although the Schoenbaum court permitted
an action where there was no United States based conduct, the security was listed on an American exchange, another factor absent from the above hypothetical. Nevertheless, it is submitted
that the "direct effect" theory would support jurisdiction in the hypothetical even in the absence of conduct in this country, since the United States clearly has an "interest" in protecting
Americans residing at home. See note 127 and accompanying text supra. See also SEC v.
United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973). But see Karmel, supra note 4, at
682-85; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 30(2)
(1965) (state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe conduct of alien simply because its conduct
affects one of state's nationals). For an excellent discussion of the problems in this area, see
Williams, supra note 4, at 327-51. This article demonstrates the problems that foreign issuers
encounter with American shareholders with respect to the offer of subscription rights. Id. at
335-40.The commentator notes the possibility that although subject matter jurisdiction may
exist, such subscription offerings may be treated as private placements. Id. at 337-38.
222. See notes 130-32 and accompanying text supra.
223. Id.
224. See Bersch v.Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975). The Second Circuit described the amount of the requisite conduct in various ways.
519 F.2d at 992-93. First, it stated that "merely preparatory acts" are not enough. Id. at 992.
See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra. The court also noted that the conduct of the defendant must be of "material importance." 519 F.2d at 993. Finally, the Second Circuit concluded
that
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foreign issuer may be able to structure its offering so as to avoid registration.
If the security involved is listed on an American exchange, however, additional uncertainty exists as to whether this factor would be sufficient to re2 25
quire registration.
With respect to foreign plaintiffs, however, the SEC's position as to the
scope of the 1933 Act appears questionable. As previously noted, the SEC
has concluded that the 1933 Act "might be construed to encompass virtually
any offering of securities made by a United States corporation to foreign
investors." 226 The courts, however, appear to take a more limited view with
respect to the securities laws in general. Indeed, the Second Circuit has
specifically noted that the application of the securities laws is not determined
22 7
solely by the nationality of the defendant.
Furthermore, in analyzing the registration requirements vis-a-vis foreign
investors, it is important to recognize the divergent opinions in the circuits.
According to the Second Circuit, the prohibited conduct must occur in the
United States for the court. to have jurisdiction. 228 It would thus appear
that registration would be required only if the offer or sale to the foreign
investor took place in the United States. As a result, it would seem relatively easy for an American or foreign issuer to structure its offerings to

Congress surely did not mean the securities laws to protect the many thousands of Americans residing in foreign countries against securities frauds by foreigners acting there, and
we see no sufficient reason to believe it would have intended otherwise simply because an
American participated so long as he had done nothing in the United States.
Id.at 992.
225. The Second Circuit has noted that Congress intended the securities laws to protect
"domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities." Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). Numerous
courts have cited Schoenbaum for this principle. See, e.g., Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549
F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
With respect to the statement in Schoenbaum concering the protection of the American
securities market, at least one court has stated that "obviously Congress intended jurisdiction
over American securities regardless to whom the securities are sold." United States v. Cook,
573 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 119 (1978). It may therefore be argued that
where listed securities are involved, registration is required in order to protect the domestic
securities markets. See note 12 and accompanying text supra. It is unclear, however, whether
this theory would follow directly from noncompliance with § 5 since it is difficult to determine
the negative impact, if any, that results from nonregistration. Specifically, in fraud cases, the
value of the security might be affected, which may have an adverse impact upon the domestic
securities markets and result in economic injury to investors. This need not be the case when
an issuer simply fails to register. It is therefore submitted that the fact that a listed security is
involved should not automatically satisfy the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction.
226. Release 4708, supra note 10, at 1362, at 2124. See notes 52-57 and accompanying text
supra.
227. See note 136 and accompanying text supra.
228. See note 140 and accompanying text supra. See also F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v.
Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Fifth Circuit has held that
a defendant's conduct satisfied the Second Circuit's formulation and that the United States Government could initiate criminal proceedings resulting from a fraud upon European investors.
United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 119 (1978).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

37

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 4

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 24: p. 729

ensure against such a result. 229 On the other hand, the Third Circuit would
permit a foreign investor to sue if "some activity designed to further ...
[the prohibited conduct] occurs within this country." 2 30 While this latter
standard appears less onerous to the investor, it is difficult to predict the
manner in which it would operate in a case in which the sole issue is registration. 2 3 1 Moreover, a court in either circuit still has the option to adopt
the position that although the distribution is within the extraterritorial reach
of section 5, a distribution solely for foreign investors in a foreign country is
232
exempt under the "nonpublic offering" statutory exemption.
Finally, it should be recognized that the registration concerns of foreign
offerings are not confined to traditional primary distributions.2 3 3 To the
contrary, secondary distributions are also subject to the 1933 Act's registration requirements. 23 4 While it is far from clear how such cases might be
229. For examples of stock transactions structured outside the United States, see Finch v.
Marathon See. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388,
390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
230. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977). See text
accompanying note 151 supra. See also Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
But see Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
231. There appears to be an argument that Kasser should be limited to SEC injunctive actions. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 n.22 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
232. See SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).
233. For example, the SEC has concluded that foreign business combinations are subject to
rule 145, which requires that a registration statement be filed whenever securities are exchanged in a merger, acquisition, or other business combination. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145
(1978). Specifically, the SEC notes that compliance with rule 145 is required when "foreign
issuers . . . [make] offers or sales of securities to United States investors, unless an exemption is
available under the Securities Act." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 79,015 (Oct. 6, 1972). See also The Burmah Oil Co. (June
13, 1974). The SEC apparently believes that the jurisdictional grant under the 1933 Act is
greater than that under the Act's 1934 counterpart. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,015 (Oct. 6, 1972). Specifically, the
SEC notes
that certain provisions under the . . . [1934] Act, and the rules promulgated thereunder,
provide exemptions for foreign issuers from certain provisions of the . . . [1934] Act
...
. Similar exemptions for foreign issuers, however, do not appear in the . . . [1933]
Act, and, in the Commission's opinion, there is no statutonj basisfor affording such exemptions by rule. The United States securities statutes were intended to protect United States
investors who buy securities of foreign issuers, and the need for the protections afforded
by registration is not diminished because the issuer has a foreign domicile.
Id. (emphasis added).
234. See Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1007 (1970) (presumptive need for registration extends to all secondary distributions not insignificant in size). Again, the issues regarding the effect of a foreign offering on secondary distributions span a wide range of factual situations. See Hopkins, supra note 4, at 308-22; Williams, supra note 4, at 327-51. For example, the issue arises as to whether restricted securities,
as defined by rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978), are restricted for sale in foreign countries.
Applying the principles discussed previously, it is submitted that even under the SEC's current
policy, the shares would be freely distributable if the securities are sold solely to foreign investors with the necessary restrictions on resale into the United States. See Genstar Ltd., [19751976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 80,358 (Oct. 6, 1975) (primary purpose of
rule 144 is to facilitate sales of relatively small amounts of restricted securities in the domestic
markets of the United States); Release 4708, supra note 10, 99 1361-1362, at 2123-25 (registration not required where securities come to rest abroad). Moreover, if the offers and sales are
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decided, it seems reasonable to conclude that the principles discussed earlier
23 5
would control.
VII. CONCLUSION

It is readily apparent that the use of judicial precedent developed in
antifraud cases to determine the scope of the 1933 Act's registration rea
quirements produces a less than satisfactory analysis. 23 6 The absence of
2 37
Supreme Court decision in this area of the law adds to the uncertainty.
Moreover, the maxim that the 1933 and 1934 Acts are "in pari materia and
must be construed together to make a consistent whole" 23 8 provides little
guidance for the resolution of an issue involving such complex and diverse
interests. 239

made outside the United States exclusively to foreign investors, it is questionable whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists. See notes 226-32 and accompanying text supra.
235. For example, the issue may arise as to the effect of a foreign distribution of securities on
a prior private placement. Specifically, assume that an American corporation issued shares to its
foreign subsidiary in a transaction meeting all the requirements of the SEC's rule on private
placements, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1978). Assume, further, that it was clear that the foreign
subsidiary planned to distribute the securities exclusively to foreign investors in the foreign
country, shortly after purchase. Does the subsidiary's intended distribution invalidate the private placement since the purchaser took with a view towards distribution? It appears as though
the SEC should answer the question in the negative if it is to be consistent with its announced
policies. See In re Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960); Release 4708, supra note 10,
1361-1362, at 2123-25; Sulpetro Int'l, Ltd. (Aug. 25, 1977). Moreover, the judicial decisions
suggest a like result. See SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970);
SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248, 256-59 (D. Utah 1958). See
also notes 226-32 and accompanying text supra.
236. See notes 209-10, 221 & 225 and accompanying text supra.
237. The only reference to the extraterritorial reach of the securities laws by the Supreme
Court was in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). In Scherk, the Court held that
in an international transaction, an agreement to arbitrate contract disputes before the International Chamber of Commerce precluded a court from hearing an antifraud claim under the
1934 Act. Id. at 519-20. Although the majority did not discuss the extraterritoriality issue, Justice Douglas writing for four dissenters, cited inter alia, Leasco Data Processing Equip. Co. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-39 (2d Cir. 1972), for the proposition that "the 1934 Act ...
applies when foreign defendants have defrauded American investors, particularly when . . . they
have profited by virtue of proscribed conduct within our boundaries." 417 U.S. at 529-30.
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
238. Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
239. See THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment 10(a), at 170 (extensive extraterritoriality might damage country's trade position); Bator, Offerings Of Foreign Securities In
The United States, in SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 309, 324-26
(1975); Williams, supra note 4, at 349-50; Karmel, supra note 4, at 670-71, 704-10; Reach of
Rule lOb-5, supra note 4, at 1392-403.
Among the most frequently cited interests in the aforementioned commentaries are: 1) the
United States interest in protecting its investors and securities markets; 2) the United States
monetary policy of encouraging foreign investment in American securities in order to assist in
the country's balance of payments problem; 3) a foreign nation's interest in its secrecy statutes
which may be in conflict with United States disclosure laws; 4) a foreign nation's interest in
developing its own regulatory system; 5) the international interest in uniformity; 6) the international communities' interest in the free flow of capital; and 7) the need for comity among
nations. As can be seen, great conflict may arise from these varying interests.
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Although courts to date have not distinguished between the extraterritorial reach of various provisions of the federal securities laws, 2 40 it is submitted that such a distinction would be appropriate where the sole issue is
failure to register.2 4 1 Unlike cases involving fraudulent conduct, in which
an expansive extraterritorial application of the statute is perhaps more easily
justified, 24 2 liability for failure to register is essentially not based upon
fault.2 4 3 As a result, application of the registration requirements to conduct
in foreign countries is tantamount to an imposition of American notions regarding the relative merits of disclosure,2 44 a process the effectiveness of
which is subject to criticism even by those in this country.2 4 5 It is therefore
submitted that the courts should not blindly extend a statute which would
produce such results without a clear indication from Congress.2 4 6 While the
247
SEC's interpretation of the statute is traditionally accorded great weight,
the ultimate resolution of the issue must be determined by examining Congress' intent. 248

Moreover, as a matter of statutory construction, the fact that Congress
may have intended a broad reach where fraudulent conduct was involved is
not necessarily dispositive of its intent with respect to the registration provisions. Indeed, the fact that the antifraud provisions apply even in the absence of a required registration would appear to indicate that these provisions should have a more broad application. 249 Furthermore, where the
offer and sale of the securities take place in a foreign country, it is questionable whether Congress intended the registration provisions to apply. As Professor Loss has noted,
it [is] . . . possible . . . to distinguish between the registration and
fraud provisions in [the context of extraterritorial application] on
240. See notes 87 & 198 and accompanying text supra.
241. See THIRD DRAFT, supra note 187, § 1604, Comment (4), at 167; Karmel, supra note 4,
at 670, 695. See also notes 194-98 and accompanying text supra.
242. See Karmel, supra note 4, at 694.
243. See Lynn v. Caraway, 252 F. Supp. 858, 862-63 (W.D. La. 1966), aff'd 379 F.2d 943
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968).
244. The SEC has indicated that "[t]he legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933 indicates that the main concern of Congress was to provide for full and fair disclosure in connection
with the offer and sale of securities." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487, 39 FED. REG.
15,261, reprinted in 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2710 (April 23, 1974).
245. See, e.g., Mendelson, Economics and the Assessment of Disclosure Requirements, 1 J.
COMP. CoRP. L. & SEC. REG. 49 (1978). See also Bator, supra note 239, at 324-26.
246. There is little doubt that disclosure systems in foreign countries are not nearly as detailed or rigorous as that in the United States. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 239, at 325; Bodolus,
supra note 1, at 109-13; Widmer, The U.S. Securities Law-Banking Law of the World?, 1 J.
COMP. Corn,. L. & SEC. REG. 39 (1978). See generally Thorpe, The Sale of U.S. Securities In
Japan, 29 Bus. LAw. 411 (1974). Moreover, some foreigners are not pleased by the SEC's
activism in this area. See Widmer, supra. In addition, at least one commentator has questioned
the United States policy of imposing its disclosure system on foreign issuers. See Bator, supra
note 239, at 324-26 (1975).
247. See SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 39 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
248. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975).
249. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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the ground that it is easier to ascribe to Congress a purpose to
prohibit the use of the United States as a base from which to defraud her neighbors than an intention that every Canadian buyer
receive a statutory prospectus even though no offers are made in
2 50
the United States.
Finally, it also seems questionable whether the registration requirements should be extended to protect Americans living abroad. 2 5 1 While
current judicial decisions suggest that the registration requirements extend,
at a minimum, to all nonexempt offers and sales made in the United States
and to those made to Americans either visiting or living abroad, 252 it is submitted that the jurisdictional reach of section 5 should be more narrowly
defined. By focusing on the purpose of section 5 and the problems associated
with extending the reach of that provision, 253 it seems appropriate that registration should only be required when distributions are made in the United
States. It is suggested that the expansive definition of underwriter contained
in the securities laws 254 will adequately, cover those distributions in the
United States attempted to be concealed behind the "foreign distribution"
label .255

Peter John Michael Rohall
250. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 369 (2d ed. 1962). Moreover, it is arguable that
such an exclusive foreign distribution would be exempt from registration as a private offering.
See id. See also notes 170-77 & 232 and accompanying text supra.
251. See note 130 and accompanying text supra. It is interesting to note that the Code makes
no reference to the nationality of the purchaser in exempting offerings initiated in the United
States but occurring abroad. See CODE, supra note 179, § 1905(b)(1). Moreover, international
law principles do not authorize a state to assume jurisdiction over an alien simply on the
"ground that the [alien's] conduct affects one of its nationals." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 30(2) (1965). It is therefore submitted that
it is questionable whether a foreign issuer should be required to register an offering made to
American nationals abroad absent a clear indication from the Congress that it wanted to go
beyond the principles of international law. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
252. See notes 215-25 and accompanying text supra.
253. See notes 240-51 and accompanying text supra.
254. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976).
255. See, e.g., SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); 4 L.
Loss, SECUITIES REGULATION 2408 (2d ed. 1969). See also Hopkins, supra note 4, at 308.
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